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Data Privacy, Information Security, e-Discovery, and Information
Governance into Due Diligence Practices, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2015),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v21i2/article5.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
Merger and Acquisition1 or “M&A” deals are both figuratively and
literally big business, where the stakes for the organization are often the
highest.2 While casual observers might expect that the importance
This article was originally presented in draft form at LegalTech® West Coast 2014 on
June 24, 2014. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors, should not be
attributed to their places of employment, colleagues, or clients, and do not constitute
solicitation or the provision of legal advice.
* James A. Sherer is Counsel with Baker Hostetler LLP.
** Taylor M. Hoffman is a Senior Vice President and Head of eDiscovery at Swiss Re.
*** Eugenio E. Ortiz is a Researcher with Quantitative Management Associates.
1

And by extension, asset purchases, divestitures, and bankruptcy transactions. See DUE
DILIGENCE FOR GLOBAL DEAL MAKING: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO CROSS-BORDER
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, AND STRATEGIC
ALLIANCES 140, 153 (Arthur H. Rosenbloom ed., Bloomberg Press 2002); see also
Fabrice Naftalski et al., Presentation at the International Association of Privacy
Professionals Europe Data Protection Congress 2012: Multinational M&A and Asset
Transactions: What You Need to Know before You Buy or Sell (Nov. 13-15, 2012).
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attached to these deals makes each new deal the vanguard for
incorporating metrics and practices regarding every efficiency and
contingency, existing research demonstrates that this is decidedly not the
case. Instead, modern M&A practices are just now beginning to catch-up
to new technologies by including data privacy (“DP”), information
security (“IS”), e-Discovery,3 and information governance (“IG”)4
concerns as discrete issues within the traditional due diligence paradigm.5
Research further demonstrates that while parties may gain efficiencies in
addressing each of these issues individually,6 there may be additional
benefits from addressing them together—in addition to related or ancillary
tax, financial accounting, and intellectual property deal considerations.7 In
2

See Lee Gomes, H-P’s IBM Envy Drives Deal, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008, at B8.

3

e-Discovery refers to the preservation, review, and production of electronically stored
information in the context of litigation and other regulatory matters; see Kenneth J.
Withers, Risk Aversion, Risk Management, and the “Overpreservation” Problem in
Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 537, 538 (2013).
4

Andrew Haslam, Information Governance - Why Lawyers Should Take the Lead,
LEXISNEXIS FUTURE L. BLOG (Mar. 31, 2014),
http://blogs.lexisnexis.co.uk/futureoflaw/2014/03/information-governance-why-lawyersshould-take-the-lead/, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7VD-6YMX (defining Information
Governance as the “newer, shinier version of what used to be called Records Information
Management . . . . Both focus on managing the risks posed by organization information
flows.”); see also The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Commentary on
Information Governance 4 (Conor R. Crowley ed., 2013).
5

See Daniel B. Garrie & Yoav M. Griver, Digital Issues in Mergers & Acquisitions, eDiscovery, & Information Technology Systems, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 25, 28–29 (2009).
6

See Clay Deutsch & Andy West, A New Generation of M&A: A McKinsey Perspective
on the Opportunities and Challenges, in PERSPECTIVES ON MERGER INTEGRATION 5, 6
(McKinsey & Company 2010), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/mm_compendiumnew, archived at http://perma.cc/E36S-7HC7 (Value creation stems from, among other
practices, “[c]apturing traditional combinational synergies, which includes efforts to
achieve economies of scale and enhanced efficiency.”).
7

See Rosenbloom, supra note 1, at 54–55.
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the right kind of transaction, this combination might just be the difference
between success and failure.
[2]
We examine how DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG are intertwined by
their very operation, and show how evolving practices that address each
concern separately without an overarching strategy suffer from, at the very
least, inefficiencies—and may, at their worst, lead to non-compliance with
court orders and regulatory guidance. We argue that a strategic
framework that incorporates these four issues in concert may provide an
alternative method for analyzing and addressing these issues piecemeal,
and that in some types of transactions (“Deals”), the framework’s
application will most appropriately determine the cost of the Deal,
evidence the maturity level of organization or asset targeted (the
“Target”), and reduce risk for the future organization (the “Acquirer”)
during and post-Deal. However, we caution that while the procedures
developed in this framework are scalable across Deals of different sizes
and complexities, this is not a one-size-fits-all approach. Instead, the size
and complexity of the Deal will determine the extent to which the due
diligence practitioners focus on the discrete aspects of the framework.
Those determinations are ultimately left to the Acquirer or party
undertaking the analysis.
[3]
An acquisition-type Deal structure, with a Target and Acquirer, is
ideal for a strategic, cost-type evaluation as the traditional due diligence
practice considers deal negotiation from a zero-sum perspective: that is,
each issue (and associated cost) is apportioned to either the Acquirer or the
Target. Our evaluation also builds off of discrete fact patterns, developing
equations which in turn provide rough calculations as to how much related
efforts will actually cost when implemented by the Acquirer at the
conclusion of the Deal.
[4]
The reality that many M&A deals do not achieve their planners’
aspirations8 indicates room for improvement in M&A practice. The
8

See JOHN T. PHILLIPS, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, DIVESTITURES AND CLOSURES:
RECORDS AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CHECKLISTS 1 (ARMA International
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structure and metrics presented in this paper are no panacea, but even
modest improvements within traditional practice may impact the whole.
Given the combination of the vast growth of information, the cost
associated with the appropriate use and maintenance of that information,
and the lack of a formalized structure for how to deal with that
information in the context of M&A deals, even moderate considerations
may have resounding effects.
A. The Best Time Will Always Be the Present
[5]
When organizations are spending money, there is an appetite for
savings. Where there is money on the table, there is a greater likelihood
that it will be available to address otherwise unfunded liabilities, and a
much better chance that Acquirers will be able to address the combined
factors presented in this paper. We also expect that, as hypothesized by
other authors but not yet supported by scholarship, the more thorough the
evaluation of tax, legal, and IT issues, the better the ultimate Deal
performance.9
[6]
Aspirations aside, current research does not demonstrate direct,
measurable results from additional due diligence. Instead, the scholarship
indicates that “a thorough evaluation of investment and financing issues,
and legal, tax and IT compatibility” did not, in fact, directly improve Deal
performance.10 However, this conclusion supports the notion that longterm strategic value—rather than short-term deal costs—drives
transactions.11 This conclusion is bolstered by anecdotal conversations
Education Foundation 2011), available at
http://www.armaedfoundation.org/pdfs/2011_Rev_RIM_Checklists.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/QT9C-M8VE.
9

See Mohammad Faisal Ahammad & Keith W. Glaister, The Pre-Acquisition Evaluation
of Target Firms and Cross Border Acquisition Performance, 22 INT’L BUS. REV. 894,
898 (2013).
10

Id. at 902.
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with deal participants: when our proposed framework was presented as a
way to distill value, it was seen as valuable for presenting prospective
costs which would be negotiated, but that was still just a balance sheet
issue for dealmakers.
[7]
Dealmakers considered more pressing the strategic nature of the
analysis along a maturity model spectrum,12—where shortcomings
uncovered through the application of the strategic framework provided
both the costs associated with those shortcomings and a view into the
operations of the Target; analogous to how a mechanic checking a car
without proper maintenance determines how much it will take to fix the
car, but also gains insight into the car’s owner. Likewise, from an
Acquirer’s perspective, even if the price is right, “the ability to buy [the
Target] may have nothing at all to do with the capacity to own.”13
[8]
Based on our research, real-world experience, interviews, and
practitioner feedback, there may be real value associated with the
application of this paper’s strategic framework which, for an appropriate
and willing Acquirer, would pay for itself (many times over) by providing
the following:



Demonstrating the maturity level of the Target vis-à-vis DP,
IS, e-Discovery, and IG issues;
Determining greater cost certainty for the Deal’s bottom line,
positioning the Acquirer nearer to paying the appropriate
amount for the Target;

11

See MITCHELL LEE MARKS & PHILIP H. MIRVIS, JOINING FORCES: MAKING ONE PLUS
ONE EQUAL THREE IN MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND ALLIANCES ix (2d ed. 2010).
12

See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, INC. (AICPA) &
CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS (CICA), PRIVACY MATURITY
MODEL 2 (2011), available at http://www.kscpa.org/writable/files/AICPADocuments/10229_aicpa_cica_privacy_maturity_model_finalebook.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/U5UR-DP5Y.
13

Deutsch & West, supra note 6, at 5.
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Presenting integration issues at a more opportune time and
increasing the odds that the resulting entity operates as
planned; and
Decreasing the Acquirer’s risk.

Proper consideration of these issues will also help those Deals in which,
due to competition or secrecy, information from the Target and its
employees is limited. This consideration will make it more likely that the
practitioner talks with the correct person, rather than a cooperative but
ultimately uninformed one.
B. Surely This Has Been Done Before?
[9]
No. The available literature provides few instances where these
issues are addressed singly14 or in tandem in M&A practice; we have seen
nothing documenting an omnibus approach. Likewise, our collective
experience indicates that, when the ideas supporting our strategic
framework are incorporated into the due diligence practice, they are often
treated as logical novelties. This disregard may stem from a lack of
systematic training in law school15 and the sometimes haphazard training
endemic of a challenging system that assigns the responsibility for the due
diligence assembly and review of information to the most junior attorneys
at law firms and consulting companies.
[10] These attorneys and professionals learn how to perform narrow
due diligence tasks according to the existing paradigm and often do them
well. However, this delegated-down assignment creates much of the
traditional M&A due diligence siloing we discuss further below. 16 For
14

See, e.g., Garrie & Griver, supra note 5, at 26.

15

See, e.g., Martin B. Robins, Intellectual Property and Information Technology Due
Diligence in Mergers and Acquisitions: A More Substantive Approach Needed, 2008 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 321, 325–26 (2008) (explaining the need for subject matter
experts when performing the IP and IT due diligence process).
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instance, a dedicated corporate practitioner is unlikely to consider complex
litigation challenges, and even less likely to sua sponte incorporate DP and
IS concerns into an existing due diligence slate of services. But the
continued development of DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG practices,
regulations, and risks dovetailing with the continued application of
Moore’s law to information growth17 makes consideration of this strategic
framework a necessity for future due diligence practices. Simply put,
there will never be a better time to address these issues than present day:
the application of the framework works to the benefit of the Acquirer, and
any improvement in these areas should be helpful. Unlike many of the
horse-trading negotiations in the due diligence context, improvements in
DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG are net positives.
[11] As briefly mentioned above, and discussed more fully below, the
application of the strategic framework determines and apportions funds to
cover costs and informs the Acquirer of the maturity of the Target. While
this work alone is supported by findings indicating that financial and
technical assessments are important aspects of due-diligence, they do not
determine Deal success.18 Thankfully, the Acquirer’s use of the strategic
16

See Douglas B. Schrock & Kevin Culp, Merging the Merger Functions: Due Diligence
and Integration Planning Complement Each Other, MIDMARKET ADVANTAGE 7, 8
(Crowe Horwath 2008), available at http://www.crowehorwath.net/crowe-horwathglobal/insights/insightsassets/merging_the_merger_functions__due_diligence_and_integration_planning_compl
ement_each_other.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/BG57-HVKZ (discussing avoidance
of siloing of work during the due diligence phase of acquisition by integration of due
diligence and integration teams to optimize results of an acquisition).
17

See Withers, supra note 3, at 540 (citing Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More
Components onto Integrated Circuits, 38 ELECTRONICS 8 (1965), available at
http://www.monolithic3d.com/uploads/6/0/5/5/6055488/gordon_moore_1965_article.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/4ELK-6MZN (“Acting as both cause and effect in the
explosion of digital information is the decreasing cost of digital storage capacity, in
accordance with the venerated Moore’s Law, which predicted as early as 1965 that the
capacity of digital information storage devices would double roughly every eighteen
months.”)).
18

See Ahammad & Glaister, supra note 9, at 902.
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framework should also return value by reducing risk, through increased
regulatory (and e-Discovery related) compliance; maintaining information
related to the Deal; and providing a more solid footing for those instances
where there is a requirement to get an outside valuation study of the
merger offer.19
II. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional M&A Practice
[12] M&A (and other) Deals are done to capture synergies. 20 Those
synergies are best realized by the Acquirer using the right information,21
captured in the right volume,22 in the correct context.23 But while M&A
activity is expected to realize greater economies of scale or improve
efficiency by shifting the cost function, those types of expected benefits
often fail to manifest.24 Deals flounder for a number of reasons, and while
Due Diligence is no elixir,25 it is an easy process to critique ex post facto.
19

See STANLEY FOSTER REED ET AL., THE ART OF M&A: A
MERGER/ACQUISITION/BUYOUT GUIDE 391–92 (McGraw-Hill 4th ed. 2007).
20

See, e.g., PETER BLATMAN ET AL., THE ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Deloitte M&A Consultative Services 2008), available at
https://www.deloitte.com/view/en_by/by/221d1350a8efd110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aR
CRD.htm, archived at https://perma.cc/9ZUG-6VQ4.
21

See Andrew D. James et al., Integrating Technology into Merger and Acquisition
Decision Making, 18 TECHNOVATION 563, 567, 570–71 (1998).
22

See, e.g., Ahammad & Glaister, supra note 9, at 895–98, 902 (suggesting that “the
more the acquiring firm learns about the target firm through thorough due diligence the
better will be cross border acquisition performance.”).
23

See ROBERT F. HARTLEY, MANAGEMENT MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES 319–20 (Lise
Johnson ed., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 10th ed. 2011).
24

See John Engberg et al., The Effect of Mergers on Firms’ Costs: Evidence from the
HMO Industry, 44 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 574, 575–76, 592 (2004).
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Multiple points of failure thus magnify the importance of the Due
Diligence process from the perspective of the Acquirer, where the
uncertain proposition of the Deal’s ultimate success relies upon
appropriate use of the Due Diligence process (and its memorialization) to
defend the rationale of the Deal, reduce the risks associated with both the
Deal and the post-Deal going concern, and justify the costs paid and
strategy envisioned in the Deal.
[13] Due Diligence’s overarching rationale is to determine whether the
Acquirer should even proceed with a given deal. Based on whether the
Target fits within the strategic aims of the Acquirer, the primary
concern—which may also kill the deal—is whether the diligence
demonstrates that the Target is misunderstood by Acquirer management,
or presents incompatible business philosophy, or technological, cultural,
or personal incompatibilities.26 This traditional “fit” practice properly
considered the following characteristics of the Target:













Assets;
Contracts;
Customers;
Employee agreements;
Employee benefits;
Environmental issues;
Facilities, plant, and equipment;
Financial condition;
Foreign operations and activities;
Legal factors;
Product issues;
Supplier issues; and

25

See, e.g., Robert Sher, Why Half of All M&A Deals Fail, and What You Can Do About
It, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2012, 4:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/03/19/why-half-of-all-madeals-fail-and-what-you-can-do-about-it/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5HB-Z53D.
26

See Robins, supra note 15, at 324.
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Tax issues.27

Because of its broad application, the traditional fit practice was the best
route to addressing the primary concern voiced by Acquirers to their
business advisors: the determination that there were no “black holes” or
unanticipated substantial liabilities not covered by warranties.28
[14] While not primary to the process in the minds of Acquirers, the use
of due diligence findings to negotiate price also serves as an important part
of the Deal process.29 Here, negotiations regarding the price of the Deal
are discussed in the form of a zero-sum-game. If there is a cost associated
with the merger, by contract or default one party will bear it.30 Because
there is a winner and a loser, both the Acquirer and Target may conduct
independent valuation analyses to determine the Target’s worth.31 The
focus of those efforts within traditional due diligence process has been the
costs associated with the tangible, internal environment and an audit of the
Target’s hard assets to determine potential liabilities as well as future
projected growth scenarios following acquisition of the Target.32 These

27

See LINDA S. SPEDDING, THE DUE DILIGENCE HANDBOOK: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
RISK MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS PLANNING 7–8 (CIMA Publishing 2009).
28

See Duncan Angwin, Mergers and Acquisitions across European Borders: National
Perspectives on Preacquisition Due Diligence and the Use of Professional Advisers, 36 J.
WORLD BUS. 32, 50 (2001), available at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090951600000535, archived at
http://perma.cc/U9J9-5B6N.
29

See, e.g., id. at 51.

30

See DONALD DEPAMPHILIS, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BASICS: NEGOTIATION AND
DEAL STRUCTURING 136 (Academic Press 2011).
31

See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE
RESTRUCTURINGS 22 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 5th ed. 2011), available at
http://download.e-bookshelf.de/download/0000/5806/40/L-G-00005806400002383571.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J9J4-D9PS.

10

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

issues are then implemented into a typical term sheet identifying the
Acquirer and Target, the purchase price, and factors that may affect the
Deal price prior to closing (such as changes in the target’s financial
performance).33 The term sheet will also include the consideration paid by
the Acquirer (i.e., cash or stock); who pays what expenses; other unique
elements; and all major representations and warranties.34
B. The Maturation of M&A Practice Due Diligence
[15] Concerns about due diligence in the 1980’s focused on cursory due
diligence which led to deals that produced sobering results. 35 In fact,
some practitioners directly posited the hypothesis that a “lack of attention
to pre-merger strategy setting, IT due diligence, post-merger IT planning
and execution, as well as poor IT/business coordination, are dominant
factors in explaining the empirical rate of M&A success” or their lack
thereof, with findings consistent with that hypothesis.36 Certainly, better
models of litigation issues led to the conclusion that, in some cases
Targets were worth less than the book value.37 In some cases, Targets had
uncertain and unknown liabilities, such as pending litigation, which once
uncovered, made true value trail book value.38 Additional experience gave
further certainty to some of these issues, and valuation techniques

32

See Michael G. Harvey & Robert F. Lusch, Expanding the Nature and Scope of Due
Diligence, 10 J. BUS. VENTURING 5, 7 (1995).
33

See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 23.

34

See id.

35

See Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 5.

36

BLATMAN ET AL., supra note 20.

37

See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 541.

38

See id.
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improved.39
[16] Twenty years ago, due diligence of Target IS and IT was carried
out in less than 50% of Deals.40 In effect, period due diligence practices
involving technology were little more than inventories of “IT staff
numbers, hardware, software and communications capabilities of the
target organization.”41 The quality and effectiveness of Target systems
were overlooked or ignored, and practitioners did not evaluate Target
information infrastructure, IS, or the skills-base of the Target employees.42
Practices have improved somewhat in recent years, gradually expanding
into practices that include, among other things, information technology
and systems information in addition to the standard financial and legal
data.43
[17] This expansion has led to a due diligence practice that attempts to
incorporate “both tangible and intangible dimensions” of each identified
function.44 But practice has been slow to envisage the use of information
as a separate function that itself bridges multiple functions. Instead, its
presence during Deals can become either a “major asset or a convoluted
and confusing nightmare.”45
[18]

Present day practice is still maturing to consider this issue in a

39

See, e.g., Peter McKiernan & Yasmin Merali, Integrating Information Systems After a
Merger, 28 LONG RANGE PLAN. 54, 58 (1995).
40

See id.

41

Id.

42

See id.

43

See e.g., Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 5.

44

Id. at 7, 9.

45

PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 16.
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constructive form, driven in part by burgeoning legal implications.46
Properly used IT assets, and IG and Personally Identifiable Information
(“PII”) policies and practices may arguably increase realized earning
power from the Deal. Their use to further strategic objectives—or hinder
them—is also part of the diligence process. Here, the reverse of the
hidden liability issue discussed above exists, where the liquidation value
of the Target does not directly measure, and may even mask, the earning
power of the firm’s assets and the Target’s assets will further vary in
value, depending on the Acquirer’s appropriate evaluation, incorporation,
and use of those assets.47
C. Present-Day Practices
[19] Modified, adapted diligence practices have led to better results in
specific case studies where the parties identified and acted upon
redundancies.48 In at least one merger between equals, redundancies were
eliminated on both sides of the deal, with related decisions made before
the Deal’s announcement.49 In that case, this led to a “profitable
integration of the merger within a year.”50 But many unsuccessful efforts
instead rely on the best of intentions and expectations that the new
enterprise will simply absorb the costs and work associated with doing the
46

See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 539 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
873–75 (Del. 1985)) (“This ruling is significant because it affirms the need for a formal
valuation analysis in all mergers, acquisitions, and LBOs. Ultimately, then, the Smith v.
Van Gorkom decision is important because it set forth, under the business judgment rule,
the responsibilities of directors of public companies to have a thorough and complete
valuation analysis conducted by an objective party, such as an investment bank or
valuation firm.”).
47

See, e.g., GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 542.

48

See HARTLEY, supra note 23, at 209.

49

See id.

50

Id.
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post-deal work—expectations unsupported by data and practice.
[20] In the most prevalent form, many organizations and aspiring
Acquirers overly rely on citizen stewards acting outside formal, structured
IG practices. These false beliefs that enterprise information is or will be
well-managed51 may undercut an evaluation into whether an Acquirer
truly has sufficient resources manage the integration process. 52 As one
study noted, though participants had aspirations and beliefs that such
internal efforts were truly successful, reports indicated that the extent to
which internal resources, such as law department counsel and IT
department staff members, actually play a role (in this case, in eDiscovery related services) were in reality “‘negligible’ or ‘minor.’”53
Therefore success in these areas does not happen organically, or by
happenstance; there is a cost to a workable strategy that both develops and
implements necessary change.
[21] Current diligence practices which attempt to incorporate the issue
of information use generally are still subject to traditional diligence
limitations, among them the practice of limiting and sequestering the
Acquirer’s team to an electronic data room, or a conference room filled
with paper requested by the Acquirer’s due diligence team (the “DDT”).54
Access to the Target’s key personnel is often limited to the data room as
well, or the Acquirer may obtain “limited access to information on a
51

See SAUL JUDAH ET AL., PREDICTS 2014: INFORMATION GOVERNANCE AND MDM ARE
CRITICAL FOR DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION (Gartner 2013), available at
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2628017/predicts--information-governance-mdm, archived
at http://perma.cc/3Q6B-R4GC.
52

See, e.g., Sher, supra note 25.

53

NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING
LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 33 (Rand Institute for
Civil Justice 2012), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/5D4H-NEJR.
54

See DEPAMPHILIS, supra note 30, at 27.
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password-protected website.”55
[22] The data room remains “a poor substitute for a tour of the seller’s
facilities [even with the advent of] [v]irtual data rooms . . . containing
financial and other data relevant to the seller.”56 This type of access is
even more constrained when the practitioners requesting interviews of
specific personnel are not incorporating questions related to the issue of
information use. And while the answers to these issues might be provided
only upon specific request, these issues affect every size and type
organization.57
D. Changes Warrant Further Due Diligence Evolution
[23] The data that Targets create and rely upon has grown and will
continue to grow; that rate of growth is steadily accelerating. Various
experts hypothesize that the continued growth of storage capacity acts as
both the cause for and effect of this growth in accord with the “venerated
Moore’s Law, which predicted as early as 1965 that the capacity of digital
information storage devices would double roughly every eighteen
months.”58 In addition to the seeming ambrosia of deceptively cheap
storage at initial stages of data aggregation (more on that later), different
technologies also have a combinatory effect, where advances in multiple
areas increase the amount of communication across those platforms, in
effect continuing the same conversation across multiple media platforms
and manifesting as a virtual skein the Gartner IT advisory firm labeled the
“Nexus of Forces.”59
55

Id.

56

Id.

57

See, e.g., JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 1, 5.

58

Withers, supra note 3, at 540.

59

JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 11 (“Nexus of Forces [NoF]” is “[t]he converging and
mutually reinforcing social, cultural and technological factors that Gartner has identified

15

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

[24] A changing regulatory landscape has increased the risk associated
with unknown DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG practices, where commentators
note that there are over 4,000 compliance regulations today in the United
States alone.60 Alone and in combination, these regulations contemplate
“[c]orporate governance, security breach notification, privacy and data
protection, and industry-specific regulations—such as money-laundering
or bribery laws”—while describing physical security measures,
application enhancements, and record retention and preservation
requirements.61
as the Nexus of Forces—social networking, mobile communications, cloud computing
and information—that drive fundamental changes across industries. The Nexus of Forces
causes fundamental disruption to the operational models, the business strategies and the
collaboration patterns of organizations.”).
60

See STEVE PALOMINO & ART VANCIL, A PRACTICE AID FOR RECORDS RETENTION 3
(AICPA Information Technology Section 2012), available at
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/InformationTechnology/Resources/BusinessIntelligen
ce/DownloadableDocuments/Records_Retention_Mktg.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/9YUK-WSZT (citing EMC Centera Governance Edition and Compliance
Edition Plus, http://www.emc.com, archived at http://perma.cc/5V3B-QFLP).
61

DEBRA LOGAN ET AL., INFORMATION GOVERNANCE BEST PRACTICE: ADOPT A USE
CASE APPROACH 6 (Gartner 2013), available at
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2630023/information-governance-best-practice-adopt,
archived at http://perma.cc/9SZC-KPU7; see also FRENCH CALDWELL, HYPE CYCLE FOR
LEGAL AND REGULATORY INFORMATION GOVERNANCE 4 (Gartner 2013), available at
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2556415/hype-cycle-legal-regulatory-information, archived
at http://perma.cc/KCN6-34FS (“The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s
requirements for brokerages to retain and supervise email, social media and other
electronic communications [and] [m]ultiple financial services regulations globally that
require analyzing data from across multiple risk silos to determine overall risk and
compliance exposures, including newly drafted social media risk management guidelines
from the U.S. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council [and] [a]mendments to
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the U.K. Civil Procedure Rules,
which specifically call out electronically stored information [and] [s]ecurity breach
privacy laws in the U.S. and Germany that require companies to notify customers that
their personal information has been compromised [and] [a]nti-fraud, anti-bribery and
anti-corruption laws in the U.S., the U.K., Germany and elsewhere.”).
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[25] Responses to these regulations are complex as well, with
organizations adding layers and layers of compliance to existing IT
processes in the wake of new regulation, incorporating binding
requirements, revised corporate and departmental policies, new controls
that begin to overlap, and associated audits. Some organizations facing
these hurdles claim that “[t]here is no way to stay in compliance,
safeguard privacy, protect IP or decrease litigation costs while responding
to the appropriate legal challenges and regulatory requests outside of a
unified information governance framework.”62 Under those circumstances
and despite a lack of success, it is especially surprising that organizations
still attempt to manage their own practices ]according to “functional,
formal, and contractual convergence.”63 Acquirers may be better served
assuming an environment of non-compliance for Targets, and instead
working on determining an appropriate risk analysis methodology for
post-Deal activities.
E. Data Privacy
[26] As information connectivity has increased, so too have domestic
and international data transfers and DP concerns. Many United Statesspecific public and private sector standards implicate the collection,
transfer, and use of PII,64 including laws regulating the “transfer, use and

62

LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 6.

63

Arturo Bris & Christos Cabolis, Corporate Governance Convergence through CrossBorder Mergers: The Case of Aventis, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATORY
IMPACT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ON ACTIVITY
WORLDWIDE SINCE 1990 71–72 (Greg N. Gregoriou & Luc Renneboog eds., Academic
Press 2007) (“Functional convergence occurs when institutions are flexible enough to
respond to demands by market participants and no formal change in the rules is
necessary. Formal convergence occurs when a change in the law forces the adoption of
best practices. Finally, contractual convergence occurs when firms change their own
corporate governance practices by committing to a better regime, possibly because the
legal system lacks flexibility or laws cannot be changed.”).
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disclosure [in the context of] medical-based class action; financial
services-based litigation” and others.65 But traditional, higher-profile risk
assessments regarding DP are normally associated with cross-border
transfers of that information or other activity with cross-border
implications.66 These concerns are therefore heightened during any deals
which touch upon multinational practice and especially those which rely
upon new markets or customers for their strategic success. Here, research
on cross-border Deals confirms what logic suggests: “cross-border deals
may present some unique opportunities but they also bring with them
unique risks that may even offset the returns.”67
[27] The increased connectivity brought by e-mail and electronic
documents is not the only force spreading data transfers and their
implicated DP. Further prospective changes in information sharing and
business operations occur as organizations modify traditional practices and
incorporate new technologies, social media, the cloud, and bring-yourown-device (“BYOD”) policies.
There are no exceptions; every
organization wrestles with some connectivity issue, and some are even
reverting to earlier data management modes, such as those organizations
operating in geographies forbidding employee communication monitoring,
and where BYOD pioneers rescind policies and remove employee options
to select their own computing devices.68
64

See generally PETER P. SWIRE & KENESA AHMAD, U.S. PRIVATE-SECTOR PRIVACY:
LAW AND PRACTICE FOR INFORMATION PRIVACY PROFESSIONALS 16, 21 (International
Association of Privacy Professionals 2012) (noting that while there are no general federal
standards regarding public privacy notices, sector-specific statutes such as HIPAA,
Gramm-Leach-Bliley, and COPPA do impose such requirements).
65

Jeffrey Ritter, Webcast: Tips to Identify and Alleviate Hidden e-Discovery Costs,
TECHTARGET SEARCHCOMPLIANCE (Aug. 27, 2013),
http://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/video/Webcast-Tips-to-identify-and-alleviatehidden-e-discovery-costs, archived at http://perma.cc/63QG-GYVW.
66

See SWIRE & AHMAD, supra note 64, at 24.

67

See GAUGHAN, supra note 31, at 554.
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[28] Most scholarship has focused on the concept of DP as it developed
through European standards. There is also a substantial overlap between
international e-Discovery issues and their intersection with foreign data
protection and privacy laws, recognized as a significant e-Discovery
trend.69 Some cross-border Deals already incorporate DP into initial due
diligence, as seen in late 2013 when a sale was abandoned after a
Canadian Acquirer scuttled a deal where the U.S.-based asset was
unusable due to DP concerns.70 That very risk analysis for DP issues is
currently being decided by U.S. judges influenced by U.S. practitioners,
and weighs heavily on the e-Discovery issues where “[p]rivacy and
personal information that is the target of privacy regulation is increasingly
influencing how e-[D]iscovery is conducted.”71

68

See Richard Walters, Bringing IT out of the Shadows, 2013 NETWORK SECURITY 5, 8
(2013).
69

See, e.g., EXTERRO INC., FIVES STEPS TO AVOID COMMON LEGAL HOLD MISTAKES 4,
available at http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/five-steps-to-overcoming-common-legalho-40170/, archived at http://perma.cc/3QKG-QUCS (citing BROWN ET AL., 2012 YEAREND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND INFORMATION LAW UPDATE: MOVING BEYOND
SANCTIONS AND TOWARD SOLUTIONS TO DIFFICULT PROBLEMS 2 (GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP 2013), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2012-YearEnd-Electronic-DiscoveryUpdate.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/RX3Q-QREP).
70

See Texas Attorney General’s Objection [to Protect Consumer Privacy] to the Trustee’s
Motion to Approve Sale Under 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) at 1, 12–13, In re True Beginnings,
LLC (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2013) (No. 12-42061), available at
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/newspubs/releases/2013/True_Beginnings_objecti
on_to_sale.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/FJ9E-KWJ4; see also Jacob Gershman,
Privacy Concerns Nix Sale of Online Dating Site, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 23, 2013,
5:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/10/23/privacy-concerns-nix-sale-of-onlinedating-site/ (Canadian-owned dating site PlentyOfFish “pulled the plug on its offer to buy
a bankrupt American rival after Texas’s attorney general warned that the sale would
expose millions of singles to privacy risks”), archived at http://perma.cc/AE22-MR6Q .
71

Ritter, supra note 65.
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F. Information Security
[29] The transfer of data and associated DP concerns interrelate directly
with the management of those documents’ access and storage, traditionally
known as data or information security. Here, the gradual evolution of IS
has included passwords and encryption techniques associated with
information, access rights, or physical security associated with the
electronic assets. When merged with DP concerns, this combination may
incorporate practices “such as ‘tokenization,’ where sensitive data is
replaced with unique identification symbols that cannot be mathematically
reversed.”72
[30] Diffuse locations of information result from instances of risky
Bring Your Own Software (“BYOS”) policies as well as cloud data
transfers, one-off operations, BYOD, productivity suites, social media,
and shadow IT.73 All contribute to “vicarious liability and corporate
reputation” concerns as well as additional concerns associated with hacker
data breaches or even data breaches that begin with employees “using
personal devices to access the corporate network, often without their
employer’s permission.”74
[31] There are breach response laws associated with data breach risks,
as well as some abbreviated mention of requirements in case law. But
while the current body of law is limited regarding organizational testing of
target methods and practices, at least one judge found that so-called
72

Judith A. Selby & James A. Sherer, BakerHostetler, Information Governance—2013 in
Review, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR (Dec. 27, 2013),
http://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/online-privacy/information-governance-2013-inreview/, archived at http://perma.cc/S5AP-TCX2.
73

See Walters, supra note 68, at 6–7.

74

Id. at 7 (citing Ellen Messmer, Mobile BYOD Users Want More Security, NETWORK
WORLD (May 9, 2012),
http://www.networkworld.com/article/2188364/smartphones/mobile-byod-users-wantmore-security.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R4HM-MN6H.).
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Monday morning quarterbacking would certainly incorporate an after-thefact assessment of liability, looking to what technology was available at
the time of the problem that might have prevented it.75
[32] While Data Security concerns are only occasionally mentioned
among many potential considerations within M&A practice, failures on
the IS front to thoroughly evaluate the Target’s IT infrastructure are often
included as causes of post-acquisition challenges, problems, issues, and
obstacles.76 Commentators are explicit in their concerns, noting that IS
should instead be the first part of the due diligence practice. 77 This
approach would incorporate both informal discussions with the Target’s
management, which in turn incorporate the Target’s commitment and
ability to perform its practices, as well as requests for any third-party
reports or certifications of the Target’s practices.78
[33] Despite the insistence that IS is a primary and key component of
due diligence practices, it “may be the least studied of all corporate
activities in pre-acquisition negotiations.”79 At least one study found that
current due diligence practices provide information that may be “adequate
for major decision-making regarding human resources, finance, general
management, operations, marketing and manufacturing,” but that fewer
than half of Deals incorporated full information on even basic software or
voice and data communication systems.80 The reasoning behind this
divide between practice and importance was not entirely clear. It may be
that information regarding Target IS/IT infrastructure is not made freely
75

See, e.g., Robins, supra note 15, at 353.

76

See, e.g., Ahammad & Glaister, supra note 9, at 897.

77

See, e.g., Robins, supra note 15, at 350.

78

See id.

79

McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 57.

80

Id.
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available to the Acquirer, that collection efforts are infrequent due to a
lack of time, priority, or representation at the deal table,81 that the right
questions are not being asked at the right time, or Acquirers simply do not
see the value in purchasing diligence services that address these issues.
[34] These mysteries should be concerning. Some 83% of enterprise IT
managers report that employees procure cloud-based applications without
the involvement of their IT departments.82 In smaller organizations, “70%
of IT managers . . . discover[] instances of cloud-based services being
used without prior consultation with the IT department”83 or other poor
practices that increase business risk and operational costs.84
[35] These issues occur regardless of employee intentions, and despite
the fact that “four-fifths of employees knew that using unapproved IT
could compromise the security posture” of their organization.85 It is
therefore unlikely that any Target will have full compliance, and the
limited instances of due diligence practices that have attempted to assess
the Target’s “risks and ability to remediate issues”86 therefore fall short of
an IS-specific solution.

81

See id.

82

Walters, supra note 68, at 5.

83

Id.

84

See JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 1.

85

Walters, supra note 68, at 5.

86

Mark Diamond, A Records Management Checklist for Mergers and Acquisitions:
Information Governance Due Diligence Is Key to Avoiding Surprises, INSIDE COUNSEL
(March 20, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/03/20/a-records-managementchecklist-for-mergers-and-acq, archived at http://perma.cc/HY79-KMQ8.
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G. E-Discovery
[36] E-Discovery as a separate concept is a relatively recent
development associated primarily with United States litigation practices;
under current jurisprudence, litigation or the reasonable anticipation
thereof87 within the U.S. and elsewhere prompts organizations to preserve
and/or create entirely new stores of extraordinarily sensitive information—
often Electronically Stored Information (“ESI”)—and retain that
information regardless of normal IG practices.88 E-Discovery is both
expensive and risky, and commentators helpfully note that every
organization faces some sort of e-Discovery challenge.89
[37] In a Deal, not only do the stores of ESI created through the
operation of e-Discovery practices often transfer from the Target to the
Acquirer, the duty to properly issue and maintain legal holds may as well,
87

See The Sedona Conference Commentary on Legal Holds: The Trigger & The Process,
11 SEDONA CONF. J. 265, 267 (2010) (“[W]henever litigation is reasonably anticipated,
threatened, or pending against an organization, that organization has a duty to undertake
reasonable and good faith actions to preserve relevant and discoverable information and
tangible evidence. This duty arises at the point in time when litigation is reasonably
anticipated whether the organization is the initiator or the target of litigation. The duty to
preserve requires a party to identify, locate, and maintain information and tangible
evidence that is relevant to specific and identifiable litigation. It typically arises from the
common law duty to avoid spoliation of relevant evidence for use at trial and is not
explicitly defined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
88

This “exception” is often mandatory in many RIM and IG policies. See Vicki Miller
Luoma, Computer Forensics and Electronic Discovery: The New Management
Challenge, 25 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 91, 96 (2006) (When creating an “electronic
document retention and deletion policy . . . [a]ny such policy must retain the flexibility to
implement litigation holds by suspending routine document deletion” when litigation is
imminent.).
89

See COHASSET ASSOCS., MER 2012 SURVEY: ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION
(ESI)—LEGAL HOLDS & DISPOSITIONS 5 (2012), available at
http://www.cohasset.com/getDownload.php?id=15, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZVEHKL8 (demonstrating how in one survey, 100% of large organizations were involved in a
litigation hold “very broad in nature affecting a large amount of information”).
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as legal holds can reach across the transaction, and even through
bankruptcy.90 These concerns were evidenced in In re NTL, Inc.,91 where
the court addressed a post-bankruptcy, securities class action that
continued as a claim against one of the subsidiaries.92 Electronically
stored documents were destroyed, and the court found that the eDiscovery duty to preserve began with the former company, but ran to the
successor, thereby rejecting the successor’s claim and imposing a number
of sanctions—including fees, costs, and adverse jury instructions.93
[38] Acquirers have also encountered third-party issues, where
confirming the location of and subsequently securing e-Discovery related
ESI (as well as other information) also implicates the Target’s law firms,
service vendors, subsidiaries, and third-party repositories.94 In turn, these
third-parties have become targets for corporate espionage and hacking, as
ESI relevant to litigation “[i]s some of the most volatile information a
company may control. It is the evidence of their truth or their innocence
or possibly liability.”95 These concerns further extend to data about the
data, such as maintaining chain-of-custody documentation for litigationheld materials, as well as maintaining the integrity of metadata associated
with those materials.96
90

See, e.g., ROBERT D. BROWNSTONE & TODD R. GREGORIAN, WRANGLING, LASSOING
AND ROPING AT THE M&A CORRAL II (2008), available at
http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/VCE_Wrangling_Lassoing_Roping_MA_Corral.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8222-QKEU.
91

See Gordon Partners v. Blumenthal (In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 244 F.R.D. 179, 193
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
92

See id. at 181.

93

See BROWNSTONE & GREGORIAN, supra note 90, at II.

94

See Ritter, supra note 65.

95

Id.

96

See Anders O. Flaglien et al., Storage and Exchange Formats for Digital Evidence, 8
DIGITAL INVESTIGATION 122, 122 (2011).
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H. Information Governance
[39] The proper management of information—IG and Records and
Information Management (“RIM”) activities associated with how
information is managed generally according to the plans and strategies of
the organization—is the glue that holds many of the other associated
issues together.97 Gartner further incorporates the specification of
decision rights and an accountability framework to direct the “valuation,
creation, storage, use, archiving and deletion of information,”98 including
“the processes, roles, standards and metrics that ensure the effective and
efficient use of information to enable an organization to achieve its
goals.”99 In the context of a fact finder judgment within the U.S.,
organizations “cannot wait until litigation happens to attempt to retrieve
information or to create a plan. That is a plan for disaster. It would be
like first deciding how to evacuate passengers once you hit the iceberg. A
safe plan involves preplanning and preparation.”100
[40] While there are quite a few issues built into the concept of IG, for
the most part, an organization may govern its information as it sees fit. As
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in dicta, IG policies are sometimes
[C]reated in part to keep certain information from getting
into the hands of others[—]including the Government, are
common in business, . . .[and a manager may] instruct his
employees to comply with a valid document retention
97

See COHASSET ASSOCS., 2013 | 2014 INFORMATION GOVERNANCE BENCHMARKING
SURVEY 14 (2014), available at
http://investors.ironmountain.com/files/doc_downloads/IRM%20%20Benchmarking%20Survey.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8222-QKEU.
98

CALDWELL, supra note 61, at 3.

99

JUDAH ET AL., supra note 51, at 11.

100

Luoma, supra note 88, at 96.

25

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

policy under ordinary circumstances.101
There is some case law governing appropriate information governance
practices102 which may include “duties they owed to third parties in
connection with litigation.”103 But while there is wide latitude for an
organization’s choice of policy, it must follow its IG policies or face
attendant risk.104 Organizations with no policies face the greatest
hurdles.105 Of course, an IG regime is more than a strategy. With the
advent of mindless ESI creation, organizations must also create adequate
storage space, hardware, and software to ensure safe storage of necessary
information for the requisite time periods and be able to retrieve those
documents.106
[41] These concerns are absolutely recognized in the M&A context,
where related risks may exist as hidden liabilities within acquired
companies.107 Without hyperbole, this risk exists everywhere: every
101

Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).

102

See, e.g., Phillip M. Adams & Assocs. v. Dell, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1193 (D.
Utah 2009); Gippetti v. UPS, No. C07-00812 RMW (HRL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
109613, at *9–12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2008); Connor v. Sun Trust Bank, 546 F. Supp. 2d
1360, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 76–77
(D. Mass. 1976).
103

Philip J. Favro, Information Technology: Sea Change or Status Quo: Has the Rule
37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Records Management?, 11 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 317, 334 (2010).
104

See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007).

105

See, e.g., Technical Sales Assocs. v. Ohio Star Forge Co., No. 07-11745, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22431, at *18, *22 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2009); Keithley v. Home
Store.com, Inc., No. C-03-04447 SI (EDL), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61741, at *18–19,
*47–49 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2008).
106

See Luoma, supra note 88, at 96.

107

See Diamond, supra note 86.
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organization stores and manages data it does not need, and those
organizations which have undertaken systematic analyses of existing data
stores consistently indicate that “redundant, outdated, trivial and risky data
represents between 15% and 60%” of the data they maintain.108
[42] As mentioned above, there are direct costs associated with doing
nothing. These are also expensive costs, even if not immediately visible
or straightforward. While the purchase price of individual servers needed
to store preserved data may not be impressive, “when associated expenses
for network connections, maintenance, redundancy, development,
security, and backup are factored in, all resources associated with a single
terabyte of preserved data were said to cost in excess of $100,000.”109
This can lead to absurd results, with one company reporting that “onethird of its IT department’s e-mail resources were now dedicated to
preserved information.”110
[43] Data migration projects, which include M&A Deals and related
transactions, are also recognized opportunities for legal and IT
professionals to “eliminate redundant, outdated and trivial data, by up to
60% in some cases, decreasing data management costs and reducing legal
and regulatory risks.”111 In contrast, practitioners who fail to contemplate
or address these types of IG issues may leave value on the table, where
potential acquisition benefits might otherwise include “technological
synergies through additions to the stock of the firm’s knowledge and
transfer of that knowledge within the new combination.”112 This may be
108

LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 3.

109

PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 53, at 88.

110

Id.

111

LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 1.

112

James et al., supra note 21, at 565. See generally FUMIO KODAMA, EMERGING
PATTERNS OF INNOVATION: SOURCES OF JAPAN’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE (1991) (using
the concept of a techno-paradigm shift to express the radical changes in the way
technology has been and continues to be developed, applied, and commercialized over
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particularly significant if the transaction hinges on an incorporation of
technology fusion or “innovations [that] require the bringing together of
different knowledge bases rooted in different technological traditions.”113
III. WHY CURRENT DUE DILIGENCE PRACTICES SHOULD INCORPORATE
DP, IS, E-DISCOVERY, AND IG ANALYSIS
A. Silos May Obscure Logical Efficiencies
[44] Deals are “dominated by financial and business managers”114 who
simply cannot perform their functions while also developing expertise in a
number of other discrete areas. This specialization has developed silos of
expertise focused on specific areas,115 leading to the type of analysis
where outside systems analysts look at hardware/software compatibility
while the legal and audit functions focus on organizational documentation,
contingent liabilities, and existing/potential internal and external
hazards.116 Those silos also exist within both the Target and the Acquirer,
where even the related functions of IG and IS traditionally operate in
separate silos, impeding practitioners’ abilities to reduce information risk;
cut the cost associated with information management; and realize the
time. In analyzing data gathered over ten years of intensive research and study of
Japanese firms, Fumio distinguishes six dimensions along which the shift is occurring:
manufacturing, business diversification, R&D competition, product development,
innovation pattern, and societal diffusion of technology).
113

James et al., supra note 21, at 565.

114

Id. at 566.

115

See, e.g., James McLetchie, Next-generation Integration Management Office: A
McKinsey Perspective on Organizing Integrations to Create Value, in PROSPECTIVES ON
MERGER INTEGRATION 31, 31 (2010), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/organization/latest_thinking/mm_compendiumnew, archived at http://perma.cc/7P5J-2NR3.
116

See, e.g., Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 11 (exhibiting the due diligence auditing
process).
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inherent value of information assets.117
[45] The very operation of a perfect silos-within-silos environment
makes cross-function cooperation practically impossible, and even the
exchange of information becomes difficult. Silos prevent the creation of a
singular picture of the environment, and logical links between and among
departments remain unconsidered. Prior to the advent of recent data
growth trends, this was inefficient.118 Now, with the continued evolution
of legal practices, technological advances, a changing regulatory
environment, and cross-border DP and IS issues, it exponentially
decreases value while increasing risk. These intertwined issues may also
impact the success of the Deal, dependent as it is on integration issues and
related personnel concerns on both the Acquirer and Target sides that are
central to consequent performance.119
B. IT and Related Integration May Impact Merger Success
[46] Dealmakers contemplate that “[i]f an inefficient firm merges with
one that is more efficient and adopts the behavior of the lower-cost firm,
we would expect to see post-merger costs lower than pre-merger costs,
irrespective of economies of scale.”120 But success in these areas requires
“the definition of the new corporate information systems (IS),
infrastructure requirements, the high cost of integration and development
of information technology (IT) systems and a reluctance to define both IS
and IT in the ex-ante stage.”121 A better definition of Technology or IT
117

See TED FRIEDMAN & TOM SCHOLTZ, ALIGN INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE
WITH YOUR BROADER INFORMATION GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES 1 (2013), available at
https://www.gartner.com/doc/2576217/align-information-security-governance-broader,
archived at https://perma.cc/KR28-B7MS.
118

See, e.g., Robins, supra note 15, at 321–23.

119

See e.g., McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 55.

120

Engberg et al., supra note 24, at 576.

121

McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 55.
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therefore incorporates “a spectrum which at one end consists of the
established products and manufacturing processes of the firm and at the
other end the ability of the firm to develop new knowledge.”122 And when
dealing with a spectrum-type issue, there is no magic to the concept that
asking the right type and volume of questions leads to a better result.123
[47] Technological interactions with the practices of an organization are
complex concerns that require more than quantitative information—they
require qualitative information as well.124 That is, a deluge of information
without structure or context is not as useful for real cost determinations.125
And when that structure or context is not addressed during the deal or
immediately after, it simply goes away. Knowledge-generating routines
and other ad hoc practices are not only likely to be fragile. Linkages with
external (and indeed internal) sources of technological knowledge may
also be informal and often specific to individuals.126 There, the link
between context and value is lost; without advance planning, the link
between context and increased risk may also compound problems in the
areas of regulatory compliance and legal holds “in that target’s transaction
counsel tends to disappear once the deal is consummated.”127
[48] It is questionable whether these issues are addressed at a rate the
costs and risk associated with them demand. As presented in a recent
study, the hardware and software aspects of the systems of the
management information system (“MIS”) function were the “least studied
of all corporate functions in premerger/acquisition due diligence. In
122
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125
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addition, MIS issues were the lowest priority when merging activities
during the post-merger.”128 Despite this lack of responsibility and
interaction during the due diligence stage, IT professionals are often
expected to “manage the post-acquisition combination of the technological
assets of acquirer and the acquired business having had little input into the
research and planning of the acquisition and the design of the postacquisition management strategy.”129
[49] Some of these activities are immediately realized, as a number of
estimates provide that some
70% of merged companies combine IS operations
immediately after the merger transaction takes place, whilst
up to 90% eventually combine IS operations into a single
data centre, usually within a year. IS/IT is likely to have a
reactive role, in that it must be integrated to consolidate
other operations.130
Finally, for each of these activities, ad hoc IS merging activities are even
more haphazard, as acquisition-related activities—at least for most
internal (and many external) parties—are by their nature non-routine
processes that each require a tailored, expert approach.131
C. Traditional Practice is Challenged by Complex
Technological Interrelations
[50]

Present-and-future organizations built on innovation and new

128

Harvey & Lusch, supra note 32, at 15; see also Norbert Kubilus, The Systems
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(1990).
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technologies present challenges where intangible knowledge assets are
extremely difficult to evaluate.132 Articles discussing the acquisition of
technologies also acknowledge that those types of acquisitions involve far
more than simply transferring ownership of physical assets and codified
technical information. Successful acquisitions also depend on the context
of the Target’s unique capabilities, values, and styles, and the tacit nature
of capabilities and the routines that underpin them. Consideration of these
factors often leads to difficulties under “the pressures of acquisition
decision making to come up with quantifiable answers.”133
[51] Instead of one-off or infrequent concerns, these are issues in every
Deal, where every transaction of substance (those requiring due diligence)
will also incorporate:




The transfer of assets from one party to another or the creation
of obligations;
The existence of risks that may affect the future value of such
assets or obligations; and
The need to apportion the risks between the parties134

D. Traditional Practice is Challenged by Complex Legal Issues
and Technological Interrelations
[52] Here, too, the legal framework surrounding and infusing the
traditional due diligence Deal has evolved in complexity such that no
individual has sufficient expertise to address all the issues. 135 Traditional
practice involves, for example, “legal teams . . . of more than a dozen
attorneys, each bringing specialized expertise in a given aspect of the law
such as M&As, corporate, tax, employee benefits, real estate, antitrust,
132

See, e.g., James et al., supra note 21, at 566.
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securities, environmental, and intellectual property.”136 There are already
provisions for litigation experts, and this role is beginning to expand to
incorporate the information-related issues to help better position a Target
for acquisition.137
[53] Even though these deals present a complex environment on both
the technology and legal sides, legal professionals are currently left with
specific issue spotting, rather than a strategic consideration of the whole.
These traditional issues include:













Basic organizational matters;
Ownership of securities;
Banks and borrowing;
Financial history;
Litigation;
General regulatory data;
Real property;
Personal property;
Intellectual property rights;
Contractual management issues;
Labor contracts and history; and
Insurance138

Further, a “vast majority of the audit is verification of the existence of
material elements of the business” and, in addition, where practitioners are
asked to provide opinions (legal and otherwise) “to the acquiring company
and its leaders on liabilities or contingent liabilities.”139
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Id.

137

See id.

138
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[54] Despite findings that Legal is also considered a core component of
integration projects common to organizations,140 this is a problem with
two uncommunicative sides: business people may not know what value
attorney assistance may provide on these topics, and attorneys may be
unaware of decisions that are made in this process until it is too late. This
is true even in the United States, where, despite its history of leading the
way in due diligence developments, due diligence is not yet a recognized
focus in the educational community; is not treated as a separate discipline
in law schools; and within the business education community, “only
covered within the accounting world, typically integrated as an audit
topic.”141 But for those in the know, the specialists who understand these
issues are valued and add value, as “boutique advisors spend more time,
probably on due diligence and negotiation, to complete deals . . . [leading
to] findings [which] suggest that boutique advisors are chosen in more
complex deals and they achieve more favorable deal outcomes.”142
[55] This lack of consideration does not consider true costs prior to the
deal, leading to a variety of results planted on different points along the
Deal diligence spectrum, where some Deals completely ignore or
shortchange; others pay lip service or incorporate some findings; and
others consider them separately and conjointly. In the first instance,
where neither the Target nor the Acquirer takes any action, not only are
issues missed, but the risk actually increases over time and post-Deal.
[56] Information, while sometimes seen as an insurmountable
challenge, is also ephemeral; both the data143 and the context surrounding
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See, e.g., Sophie Maire & Pierre Collerette, International Post-merger Integration:
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it degrade. The second situation is admittedly better, where some action is
taken by the Target, the Acquirer, or both. This decreases or shifts the
risk; however, decisions made in one area inevitably affect other areas of
the overall deal structure, and attempting to contain the risk “associated
with a complex deal is analogous to catching a water balloon. Squeezing
one end of the balloon simply forces the contents to shift elsewhere.”144
Here, efforts are likely more of a stop-gap rather than total improvement,
but some improvement is vastly better than none at all.
[57] In the third instance, full action is only taken after the fact by the
Acquirer; that is, rather than developing these ideas during the due
diligence practice, the Acquirer assumes it will happen in-house after the
deal is done. First, and contrary to some public belief,145 information
storage is expensive,146 with significant attendant time and budgetary
commitments.147 If the Acquirer considers the Target asset-by-asset and
does not include the existing IT budget as part of its analysis, these costs
may not be factored into the Deal price.
[58] Of course, once the Acquirer decides that it must deal with the
acquired information (we argue properly part of the Deal), the effort to
properly manage that information costs time and money, which cannot be
recouped at that point post-transaction. This lack of consideration also
loses the benefits potentially gained in these activities, where prior
143

See e.g., Bit Rot, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 28, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21553445, archived at http://perma.cc/JGR8-DH2Z.
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knowledge and experience contributes to a fuller prospective picture and
better results148 and can lead to direct cost savings149 rather than additional
realized costs post-Deal close.
[59] There are further costs associated with redundancy in the process;
avoiding that issue requires addressing overlapping and redundant efforts
by bringing IG projects in the areas of privacy and data security together
during integration.150 A lack of consideration also results in the loss of
protections that are available through the courts, where the practices
would otherwise need to demonstrate that the participants took actions in
good faith, living up to the standard that “a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.”151 The issue in turn recognizes the issue
associated with attorneys leaving with valuable knowledge, where of
course extensive post-merger integration (if attempted) will often be a
difficult and time-consuming task.
[60] Attorney involvement is expected to incorporate that action into a
negotiated Target price, where “this investment in resource and time
[would] be used to counter inflated premiums for the target firm.”152 The
attorney and expert involvement provides shareholder value return, and
may provide further assistance in assessing how viable the Deal results
will actually be. “In-house lawyers are often key players in determining
148

See PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 10–12.
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the strategy and implementation of acquisitions and so it is important that
they can provide guidance to their colleagues on the importance of
effective integration.”153 Further, some work is being done on these issues
in the bankruptcy context.154 But there has not been a presented
framework outlining these four issues (plus information concerning the
Deal itself) in a cohesive practice.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO IMPROVE M&A DUE DILIGENCE IN APPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES
[61] The proper combination of these concerns will enable due
diligence practitioners to realize the exact type of scale economies 155 that
normal M&A practice attempts to provide by the very deal itself. It is no
secret that an appropriate consideration of Target records and other forms
of information add major insights to M&A decisions.156 This framework
will incorporate related analyses of interrelated advances in technology in
practice that ultimately may affect the bottom line of the Acquirer.
[62]
153

The concept is straightforward: a modified due diligence practice
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including directing off-site records storage centers to simply destroy their holdings, as the
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built from traditional efforts, which have already begun to address IT
practices (albeit slowly and imperfectly), licensing procedures, and the
costs and activities associated with the management of IT assets and
information. The DDT will work with each subject matter expert
(“SME”) with a slate of additional questions—both focused and
unfocused. These additional questions will, in large part, simply add to
questions already asked and meetings already arranged. In even those
instances where the correct people are not in the room, or the DDT has not
asked for a particular schedule, policy, or explanation, these additional
questions and even lack of answers will help to give a clearer picture of
post-Deal reality.
[63] It is time to acknowledge and reap the benefits from addressing
these issues in the context of the Deal, despite the history, which fails in
large part to acknowledge them outside of well-defined areas. Fixing
issues ex post facto is a dubious solution, where Deals provide a strong
internal momentum that sweeps aside “all but the most obvious of postmerger integration considerations.”157 To best position an Acquirer for
proper and beneficial good corporate governance and related practices—
and to maximize post-merger value through realistic purchase prices, these
aspects should be prioritized before, rather than after, the Deal.158 Just as
lawyers are now encouraged to import the Business Judgment Rule
(“BJR”) into preservation,159 corporate Deal makers may acknowledge
what happens on the other side of the fence.
[64] The principles for diligence in a Deal fit into the paradigm of
Master Data Management (“MDM”), a technology-enabled business
discipline in which business and IT cooperate to provide “uniformity,
accuracy, stewardship, semantic consistency and accountability for an
enterprise’s official, shared master data assets.”160 The overall framework
157
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relies first on a commitment to incorporating the three essential elements
of the BJR:





Using an independent or audit-type decision maker without a
personal interest in the outcome to assess the accuracy of
representations made by IT professionals, RIM personnel, and
other interested parties;
Arming the independent decision maker with the necessary
facts to make a reasonable judgment; and
Making a judgment on the basis of the best interests of the
business.161

In the context of the Deal, this focus is on the assets and issues the
Acquirer will inherit, and what it will take to successfully manage both.
With this in mind, each area covered will focus first on the correct Target
personnel to query, the appropriate questions to ask, and the manner in
which the due diligence practitioner will memorialize the results.
[65] Managing information assets works most successfully when
addressing interrelated DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG issues in concert.
Legal concerns are already part of traditional due diligence practices,
where practitioners examine and analyze the existing liabilities and
ongoing litigation of the Target. An evolution of the practice would also
incorporate prospective litigation—information preserved by legal
regarding litigation (ongoing and prospective).
Examining the
information associated with the Target’s liabilities and litigation may lead
into a broader examination of the Target’s IG, as well as fomenting
inquiries into how the Target manages information on personnel, policy,
and technical issues. Questions would also include whether there is
information kept on specific servers for a specific purpose, the origin and
reasons of which will be lost once the migration is complete. These
160
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inquiries round out the data locations, types, and volumes as well as the
current status of each.
[66] The inquiries into these issues, and information management
generally (both legal and otherwise) may consider near-in-time restrictions
associated with data management and data transfer. For IS issues, the
diligence may question how the Acquirer will be able to access data with
passwords, data stores with limited access rights, data use prescribed by
statute, or even data associated with IS documentation and monitoring
efforts. These inquiries may also incorporate questions regarding how any
data migration will impact the business continuity procedures of the
Acquirer.162
[67] Finally, the diligence will ascertain and evaluate existing DP
concerns (and documentation about the way in which they were dealt
with) to determine just how much of the existing infrastructure and
practices can intelligibly be drawn into the new organization. In this
context, the locations of where information was kept by the Target, why it
is kept there, how the function is integrated within the Target, and even
the cultural features of the Target’s location(s) will impact the results of
the diligence—and may affect the ultimate outcome of the deal.163
[68]

A proposed framework that addresses DP, IS, e-Discovery, and IG
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outages, failures in IT or telecommunications systems, loss of transport networks or
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bulldoze its culture on the acquired firm (despite how this may affect pride and
willingness to cooperate). As we saw with the Daimler merger with Chrysler—in reality
a merger of unequals—arrogance and resentments surfaced.”).

40

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

begins with finding the right people within the Target to query. As an
added benefit, the diligence also determines if the correct people are not
there, a not unusual occurrence, as critical people often leave before an
acquisition or asset purchase is finalized. Moreover, some roles go
unfilled, and some roles are never even recognized as assignable
responsibilities. Once the individuals are identified, instead of paralyzing
the process with too much detail, the focus of the inquiry then incorporates
simple, strategic questions, such as:





What is the most critical business information the Target, your
group, and you maintain?
What information is shared across business processes on an
enterprise wide basis?
Where is the documentation underlying our intellectual
property?164
What can we let go?165

These questions may lead to the construction of a data map—a focus for
further determinations as to what steps the Acquirer needs to take and at
what times—rather than a more time consuming and expensive wish list.
A workable framework might also include the search for and evaluation of
other intangible assets, including:




164

Intellectual property;
Trade secrets;
Contracts and licenses;
Structured databases;

See LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 5.
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greatly reduce the danger of sinking expenditures in essentially irrecoverable
investments.”).
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Structured personnel groupings and organizational networks;
Existing organizational culture; and
The “know-how” of employees and managers.166

This framework considers the use of service provider analysis to bid
effectively on projects prior to their performance post-merger. The
partnership between the due diligence practitioner, often an attorney or
attorney-led team, and the service provider which, in effect, bids on the
post-Deal work, is key to much of this framework’s potential success. As
discussed in greater detail below, the service provider is incentivized to
provide a realistic pricing structure to implement the work envisioned in
the diligence process, as an ideal service provider partner wants to perform
the post-Deal work and might not risk being underbid for that opportunity.
In fact, in instances where there is a great deal of post-Deal work, each
member of the DDT should examine those issues with which she has the
most knowledge, a self-taught insider perspective into the deal where she
knows best what the post-Deal work will cost.
[69] Finally, the framework also includes references to the timing of the
post-Deal integration, understanding that a less than timely integration
lowers the realized value from the transaction.167 Further, from the
perspective of the Acquirer, and according to the problem of compound
interest, decisions made at the point of the deal will only be magnified
over time,168 as present-day decisions subject to the incredible growth of
166
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data will have exponential effects going forward.
V. THE DP, IS, E-DISCOVERY, AND IG FRAMEWORK
A. Data Privacy
[70] Many organizations have a Data Protection Officer that handles
inquiries related to regulations the Target is subjected to, as well as the
implications of new technologies and other unique queries.169 An
appraisal of this operation will be telling, as the level of sophistication
may vary dramatically. The DDT should not expect to find exhaustive,
documented policies and procedures covering the DP waterfront within
the Target; as not all companies have sophisticated DP policies and
procedures and some “organizations do a terrible job of using and securing
data.”170 Insight here will be helpful to the DDT in comparing-andcontrasting DP information with what the legal and IG interviews provide,
rounding out articulated data sources and stores, and determining what
concerns the Target evidenced during its prior operations.
[71] Regardless of the existing structure, and as with Data Security, the
Data Privacy analysis is less about identifying specific information stores,
and is more focused on what to do about those stores. This portion of the
analysis starts with some basic questions (such as whether the Target is
Safe Harbor Certified) and then moves into the more holistic evaluation of
the Target’s practices through the lens of the generally well-established
principles of data protection that include the following:


The initial data collection of protected data (both by the Target
and subsequently by the Acquirer) should be limited;

169

See Larissa T. Moss & Sid Adelman, The Role of Chief Data Officer in the 21st
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The collected data should be relevant to the reasons for its
collection;
The collected data and the stated reasons for its collection and
use should be accurate;
The data should be processed lawfully and in accordance with
the data subject’s rights;
The data protection measures should be adequate and the data
kept secure;
The data should be used for limited purposes;
The data should not be kept longer than necessary;171 and
The data should “not [be] transferred to countries without
adequate protection”.172

In addition to the lawful reasons indicated above for data privacy
concerns, the due diligence process and the incorporation of these issues
post-Deal are important for “local historical and cultural norms . . . [which
provide] significant social pressures to conform to local forms of
rationality,”173 and may provide some additional benefits to a U.S. based
Acquirer when acquiring a foreign Target. That is, an additional benefit of
providing some due diligence impact is the importance shown to the
people interviewed and eventually impacted (i.e., ‘we the Acquirer value
your privacy rights and this transition will be less impactful than it could
have been otherwise’).
[72] The protection of data subject to DP concerns includes an analysis
of the specific devices and processes that the Target uses to maintain
security where the DDT examination might make special care to focus on
the security afforded to customer or employee personal information, as
171
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Id. at 310.
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Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 147–48 (1983)).
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well as PII.174 This will also incorporate other questions into the technical
measures the Target may use for its DP practices, including privacy
management tools that may help “conduct privacy impact assessments,
check processing activities against requirements from privacy regulations,
and track incidents that lead to unauthorized disclosures (investigation,
remediation and reporting).”175
[73] Those tools may also “analyze and document data flows of
personal information (nature of data, purpose of processing, data
controller), support authoring and distribution of privacy policies (for
which they provide templates), and track user awareness (users
acknowledging having read the policies).”176 Of note here is the circular
nature of the DDT practice: each of these types of DP technical measures
may incorporate data stores the Acquirer may have to integrate or
remediate, such as logs of consents, acknowledgements, or data collection
purposes.
[74] Additional layers of DP analysis will incorporate the jurisdictions
at play in the Deal, and an appreciation for—if not an investigation into—
the jurisdictions’ data privacy required practices, some of which are
directly incorporated into the regulations themselves.177 This is especially
true in cross-border or multinational Deals, where the DDT might ask the
Deal strategists questions about the Deal’s purpose and eventual shape
(e.g., whether the market is to be treated as homogeneous, or whether
customer requirements differ between countries).178
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B. Information Security
[75] As with other categories of analysis, determining the impact
information security may have on the Deal and post-Deal integration
begins with finding the right personnel to interview and the right materials
to review. At least here, the IT component is ingrained enough in
common practice that, unlike many instances of IG or DP, it is likely that
there will be at least one person, if not an entire department, dedicated to
supporting the IT function. Within that group, based in part on the normal
operation of the IT systems themselves, there is a natural determination of
permissions to particular information sets or resources. These are often
documented, and the DDT may compile copies to both determine the costs
associated with and to actually assist with the actual activities surrounding
post-Deal migration and harmonization activity.
[76] The questions to ask the IS representative(s) will focus on the
Target’s memorialization of security levels and associated “accountability
and decisions rights,” any decisions the Target has made when deciding
“between conflicting security requirements and risk affinities;” and the
manner in which IS has been keeping the Target’s executives and
stakeholders appraised of Target’s information risk management
practices.179
[77] Some of the issues the DDT will uncover when involving IT are
novel in the due diligence space, where, as indicated above, although most
Acquirers acknowledge the role of IT in post-Deal business strategy, few
consider IS/IT integration requirements.180 These issues, however, will be
similar to the issues raised during the DP investigation; for example:
questions focused on how the organization developed existing policies;
how they operate on the information; and where critical information (e.g.,
179

TOM SCHOLTZ, SURVEY ANALYSIS: INFORMATION SECURITY GOVERNANCE, 2013–14,
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passwords, security functions, and other access mechanisms) resides.
[78] An additional step exists within the IS space, where access rights
and documentation thereof may not even focus on a defined location or set
of captured information. Modern IS practices also incorporate “access
management and auditing of web-based applications that are equivalent to
traditional on premise application management policies” that seek to gain
“the productivity benefits of the cloud.”181 A common refrain within DDT
IS interviews is often, “what else do you manage?,” as IS professionals are
also commonly tasked with supporting compliance efforts “by detecting
and preventing insider misuse of applications—whether inadvertent, such
as sharing log-in details with colleagues, or intentional, such as copying or
forwarding sensitive financial details or customer lists.”182
[79]

The DDT IS inquiry focuses on three temporal components:
1. The past, documented processes within IS that, even if retired,
may shine light on “dark” or “dusty” data sources uncovered as
virtual unknowns within the IG due diligence component—and
will, of course, indicate further information regarding the
Target’s maturity model score.
2. Present-day practices, key to what the Acquirer is purchasing,
give even more validity to the maturity model score.
3. The IS inquiry will also focus on the core components of future
integration projects for IT and systems—that is, the transfer of
data to the Acquirer and its harmonization with new standards,
as well as a continuation of the appropriate security protocols
and protections, which may include distribution lists and access
to files and systems.183

181

Walters, supra note 68, at 10.

182

Id.

183

See, e.g., Maire & Collerette, supra note 140, at 285–86.

47

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

DDT inquiries can incorporate additional levels of detail and involve
checklists listing various types of integrated technological systems. These
include transaction controls monitoring (“TCM”) technology, which
integrates governance, risk, and compliance issues and monitors enterprise
resource planning (“ERP”) and financial application transaction controls
which improve financial governance and automate audit processes. TCM
software may also help identify exceptions to policies, business rules, and
built-in application controls.184
[80] The DDT will also inquire into auto-delete type functions, as
nearly all organizations enable automatic software processes that delete
sent or received e-mail after a certain set time.185 The DDT will use this
opportunity to confirm that the IS understanding is operationally the same
as IG and legal (and that incorrect understandings of these automatic
operations will not derail strategic decisions made regarding legal hold
and IG). Further, the DDT will inquire into the IS perspective on legal
holds, where IS may be aware of orphan data stores or tasks which were
delegated to IS or IT without effective Target sign-off, as in many cases,
Target’s legal department will have instituted a legal hold, but never
rescinded it, even if the matter is no longer ongoing.186 Data Maps are
often key components of IS practice associated with these efforts which
may implicate, among other issues, legal holds.187
[81] IS professionals interviewed by the DDT might be encouraged to
give their own perspectives on what the costs associated with an ex ante
evaluation of what the acquired organization’s IS/IT infrastructure would
184
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WASH. L. REV. 860, 873–74 (2011).
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be.188 As with IG professionals knowing where the “bodies are buried,”
the IS interview may raise issues where expedient work-arounds were
employed that will have to be dealt with by the Acquirer, with or without
the assistance of the former Target employees. These are critical
concerns, which despite being “often cited as major reason[s] why IS/IT
systems contribute to ex-poste problems,” have been long underserved, as
“it would appear that the ex-ante due-diligence process rarely includes a
thorough evaluation of the IS/IT infrastructure” which may be further
complicated by the difficulty associated with evaluating IS and most
companies’ obliviousness regarding “the total value of their investment in
IS/IT, including the value of software and data.”189
C. E-Discovery
[82] The DDT inquiries begin with the recognition that legal hold best
practices recommend creating “Information Management Team[s],” which
include experts in computer forensics, law, information management, IT,
and auditing.190 Regardless of whether the Target has a well-defined
team, the DDT might address each of these issues in turn, asking such
questions as:





Are legal holds implemented with forensic collection?
Who traditionally directed the implementation of legal holds
and answered any questions?
Where is the legal hold data stored?
Who is responsible?

[83] A good place to start is with litigators, as a vast majority (82%) of
legal holds are overseen by in-house legal teams.191 But 82% does not
188

See, e.g., McKiernan & Merali, supra note 39, at 58.

189

Id.

190

See Luoma, supra note 88, at 93.

49

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

equal 100%, and e-Discovery efforts are sometimes a part-time duty
assigned to a variety of employees.192 Here, too, best practices and court
requirements may require guidance, supervision, and audits where the
Target has held the “hands of their employees and other custodians—both
internally and externally—in navigating the complexity of e-Discovery
and making sure everybody knows what they need to know.” 193 DDT
questions regarding the Target’s Legal Hold policy will lead to issued
instances of the policy, as well as the people subject to the policy.
[84] There may be technological solutions in play, but the “majority of
litigation holds are still managed and tracked manually.”194 In fact, more
than half of litigation holds are tracked by manual or written processes;
only one third use an automated software tool (including commercial eDiscovery tools or custom software); and five percent still rely on verbal
legal holds.195 Legal holds may be broader than responding to an existing
or threatened lawsuit, as the DDT must also inquire as to information
retained for regulatory compliance purposes,196 as such requirements may
travel with the Deal and become the responsibility of the Acquirer.197
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See BRAD HARRIS, LEGAL HOLD AND DATA PRESERVATION: BENCHMARK SURVEY
2013 10 (Zapproved Inc. Sept. 2013), available at
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[85] The DDT may also acknowledge and recognize the overlapping
nature of legal holds, which is not a one-custodian-to-one hold issue.
Instead, the retention of legal hold material involves a complex interplay
that will take some effort to untangle, where Targets routinely involved in
multiple legal actions may face rolling litigation holds, “in which
collections of documents and ESI are preserved for litigation, overlapping
with subsequent litigation and with litigation to come. Since the scope of
the duty of preservation includes ‘reasonably anticipated’ litigation as well
as filed actions, caches of data may be under one or more litigation holds
interminably.”198
[86] A beginning point for this complex interplay of legal holds is to
develop a basic data map, where the Target explains the company’s
litigation profile (e.g., why it sues and gets sued) and then provides an
existing—or assists the DDT with building out—a high-level data map
broadly focused on the sources that house the documents and data that
relate to those types of disputes.199 The DDT cannot rely entirely on
existing component pieces from the Target to compile even a high-level
data map, as at least one study indicates that approximately a third of
organizations do not track legal holds at all while “another third relied on
rudimentary spreadsheets.”200 A DDT effort in this area therefore might
seek relevant information, but may end up basing the entirety of its
analysis on personal interviews and extrapolations from existing sources.
D. Information Governance
[87] IG issues are already listed on some recent due diligence
questionnaires, which incorporate advice to “learn the location of all
documents” and satisfy the Acquirer that the Target “has retained adequate
records” which satisfy federal, state, and the internal policies of the
198

Withers, supra note 3, at 544 (citations omitted).

199

See JENSON & FORMAN, supra note 187, at 1–2.

200

EXTERRO INC., supra note 69 (citation omitted).

51

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

Target.201 DDT inquiries into IG which incorporate that standard as well
as other considerations might start by identifying any defined, existing IG
group within the Target. However, much of the knowledge regarding the
nuts-and-bolts of the Target’s practice and experience likely resides with
the Target’s Corporate Records Manager (“CRM”). Securing the CRM’s
participation is ideal; if that role is defined within the Target, the CRM
likely knows more about the “known unknowns” and may be a firstperson resource for the M&A Team work generally as well, as part of the
organizational change.202 Another avenue of inquiry, if there is no central
policy or point of responsibility, is into existing information governance
projects, where at least half of most global organizations will have
between two and seven disjointed but simultaneous IG projects.203
[88] The DDT may also inquire into Legal Holds from the perspective
of the IG professionals, where best practices for those individuals have
long held that IG and other IT professionals contemplating archiving
efforts or other big-ticket IG projects “should work with legal and
compliance professionals to create rules for retaining only the data that is
necessary, usually no more than three years’ worth, or that which has had
a ‘litigation hold’ placed on it.”204 The IG practitioners may be even more
painfully aware of cases where legal never rescinded an expired litigation
hold.205 Finally, any Data Maps uncovered during the DDT’s examination
of IG practices might also be tied back to the legal hold analysis.206
201
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[89] As with legal hold practices, there simply may not be one
individual responsible; these efforts may have been split into ad hoc
practices within divisions, or even ignored or postponed entirely. Many
organizations face uncertainty as to who should be responsible for even
basic IG efforts such as records retention and deletion policies, including
who develops the policy, who monitors the policy, and who has
authority.207
[90] If there is no well-defined group or individual(s) assigned with IG
responsibilities, the DDT may look to the IT department, as most
organizations assign sole responsibility for electronic records retention
policies to their IT departments despite “little or no training on the legal
requirements of electronic document retention and deletion.”208 If a
meeting with the IT department is similarly unsuccessful, the DDT may
focus on legal and human resource departments to determine if there are
ad hoc delegations there. If these too are unsuccessful, then the DDT may
begin to capture data sources through IT and the construction of a data
map, and start to analyze those data sets as separate “known unknown”
data sources that the Acquirer will have to remediate and harmonize.
[91] The DDT analysis may begin with a simple IG matrix that divides
IG efforts into five categories across the information lifecycle. This
lifecycle is typically dictated by:




“A business requirements for keeping the record because of its
value;”
“A legal reason for keeping the record, such as investigation or
a discovery request;”
“A regulatory reason, often dictated by an industry

207
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208
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standards;”209
Information of inherent value, such as leases, insurance
policies, deeds, or the like; and
Information about the Deal itself, which includes both the
memorialization of important Deal aspects as well as any
information that supports the logic of the deal and will relate to
potential claims in any lawsuits filed regarding the Deal.

Within the broad framework of the five categories of information
retention, a more refined analysis may address four additional, important
responsibilities that the Acquirer will address post-Deal include:
1. Harmonizing existing Target decisions with post-Deal
compliance with Acquirer requirements, laws, and regulations;
2. Implementing those retention decisions and the categorization
of the information;
3. Educating and training the Acquirer’s employees regarding the
new information; and
4. Enforcing and auditing these types of policy decisions
The DDT will want to consider whether the Acquirer may achieve some of
these goals by incorporating decision rights and accountability and
policies aligned to business objectives that are monitored and measured
according to compliance and assurance metrics within tolerances. 210 The
key here will be a plan that incorporates the backing and support of top
management in each of these areas. Without that support, compliance is
difficult even if pivotal to avoiding court scrutiny.
209
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[92] A prospective plan for effective information transition,
harmonization, and future use may include the identification of an
Acquirer Information Management Director who reports in some direct
manner to upper level management; likely, the Chief Information Officer
of the organization.211
Best practices indicate the Information
Management Director would actually occupy a separate and distinct
position from the IS or IT Director so that she can focus entirely on the
“complicated and critical area of document management.”212
[93] Ideal DDT practices will even go as far as inquiring into the
existing IG practices and associated, defined retention requirements of the
Acquirer. Answers provide a better sense of how extensive the transition
process will be. The inquiry also includes the identification of Target
information that will not necessarily be monetizable but important for
governance purposes.
[94] Other integration issues associated with diverse business efforts are
implicated but not directed by IG, such as confirming that “the basic
hardware and software relied upon by each organization is reasonably
current, and how difficult it will be to make the organizations’ computers
to talk to each other.”213 And, “if the integration of the two companies
involves sharing data between companies’ systems—for example with
sales or inventory data going into a financial accounting system,” the DDT
will work with due diligence IT hardware consultants to determine
whether the systems would allow for migration, “or whether an ‘interface’
program is required.”214
[95]

Finding an existing structure or memorializing the logical
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underpinnings of an ad hoc structure are sometimes insufficient. The
DDT may also be tasked with confirming the purpose for the Target’s IG
structure. This is more than simply performing a basic maturity model
analysis. While existing IG practices and RIM policies may indicate how
sophisticated the Target is as a whole, their intent has mattered to courts,
where IG policies enacted in good faith are usually protected, but policies
enacted for the wrong purpose(s) are suspect in nature.215
[96] The DDT may, of course, confirm the effect of the IG structure.
There is sometimes a gulf between policy and practice, and that gulf
widens the more the Target’s efforts depend on human action and less on
technological implementation. Here, an examination into how auto-delete
(or other mechanical remediation efforts) operates is crucial. While courts
have found “nothing necessarily improper about a company’s reasonable
pre-litigation document retention policy whereby documents are disposed
of in periodic intervals,”216 fact finders have begun to delve into parties’
information governance issues or lack thereof;217 and “[g]enerally
speaking, spoliation arguments are unsuccessful if relevant documents
were destroyed in accordance with the business’[s] reasonable document
retention policy and/or practices. However, even a reasonable practice of
destroying documents may have unintended consequences.”218
[97]
215
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informal structure, how the IG efforts actually function. Here, studies
indicate that the DDT may expect to find that most Targets of reasonable
maturity will
[H]ave well-developed retention and disposition schedules
for their paper records and electronic data, . . . [but]
approximately 25% are not routinely destroying outdated
records and ESI, and 50% have an approval process that
adds a layer of decision making on top of the disposition
schedule, rendering it largely ineffective because decision
makers are averse to disposing of records and ESI, even
when no longer needed for business purposes, subject to
legal retention requirements, or subject to a formal
litigation hold.219
[98] The DDT must then determine, if the policies are not applied or
followed, where the information is stored. In the near past, information
with no business purpose, legal hold requirement, or regulatory purpose
was “found on employee desktops, shared drives, offline storage, and
legacy system media.”220 This has expanded further into the myriad of
locations available to employees, which include company-sponsored or
endorsed efforts (such as BYOD practices) or non-sanctioned, employeedriven instances of shadow IT. The DDT may find and quantify what it
can, with the reasonable assumption that at least the operation of this
diligence is identifying the “known unknowns” and perhaps cutting down
219
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on the “unknown unknowns.”
[99] That unknown data represents a departure from normal records and
information management RIM practices—if data is being properly
managed, it is “known.” There are statutory obligations to proper RIM
function for specific types of corporate records,221 and there are common
law obligations as well. While document retention policies have been
condoned in Zubulake V222 and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Arthur
Andersen,223 courts have considered—and have been adjudicating—the
general operation of organizations’ RIM policies at least as early as 1984,
when the Southern District of Florida found that an organization “failed to
demonstrate that its document retention policy [was] actually implemented
in any consistent manner . . . [and that its] absolute failure to provide any
evidence on this issue must be construed as a tacit admission that the
policy is a sham.”224 And the court in In re Prudential involved sanctions
levied, in part, for Prudential’s lack of a “comprehensive document
retention policy with informative guidelines . . . .”225 Finally, the DDT’s
perspective is not to save everything at the point of integration with the
Target; the DDT has the Deal firmly in mind as an opportunity to engage
221
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in record remediation and deletion efforts as well.226
E. Due Diligence and Record Keeping for the Deal Itself
[100] Suggested use of the DDT might include two components of
capturing the DDT diligence. First, the DDT will clearly manage and
maintain the due diligence work it performs. Second, the DDT may also
be among the chief custodians of the Deal information generally; that is,
the “documents, data, and evidentiary records created during the Due
Diligence process” that “comprise one of the most important sets of
information that an organization possesses.”227 In addition to the DDT’s
investigative efforts, maturity model analysis, and post-Deal integration
modeling, the DDT may also seek to maintain available Deal documents,
such as:








Merger or acquisition agreements;
Financial documents;
Strategic plans;
Technology plans;
Inventories of organizational assets;
Copyrights or patents that literally “seal the Deal;”228 and
“[C]opies of relevant contracts and related Deal negotiating
history”.229

The DDT—or other responsible party—must understand that inadequate
Deal documentation or its misplacement can create high dollar losses for
226
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Acquirers where, due to contested Deals, “the need to create serious RIM
support for Due Diligence processes is self-evident.”230 A properly
employed DDT may be uniquely placed to assist with this record-keeping
function, as advanced planning for recording information associated with
the Deal is traditionally underserved due to the Deal’s immediacy and the
fact that “storage, retrieval, retention, and preservation issues [are] often
not realized until after a record is created.”231
[101] This is yet another component whose time has come, because
despite the traditional ad hoc nature of deal record keeping that common
to most organizations, the absence here has “particularly grave
consequences when the value of some [Deal] documents may be very high
(possibly worth millions of dollars) and the risk of loss increases
drastically as the complexity of M&A workflow rises.”232
[102] Managing information and following good record keeping
practices (as well as asking the right questions during the Deal) is not just
a risk mitigation strategy—executives may use Deal activities as an
opportunity “to build decisional consensus and document the rationale for
the M&A by initiating excellence in Due Diligence recordkeeping.”233
Here too, the absence of a systematic practice has “contribut[ed] to wellknown M&A disasters.”234
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[103] With increases in the sophistication of shareholder derivative suits,
Acquirers need to “retain evidentiary records longer and be more capable
of controlling records that are collaboratively shared” during the Deal.235
This control may include a so-called “stop the presses” provision that
provides a post-Deal workflow where IT or IG confirms with the
Acquirer’s attorneys, and/or HR, and/or the IG before overwriting data.236
This provision would be incorporated into a Deal-oriented “Records
Retention Policy (and in a separate Litigation-Hold Protocol, if any); and a
Separation Policy/Checklist.”237
F. Synergies, Cross-Pollination, and the Conclusion of the
Process
[104] As described in passing above, the framework provides synergies
across each separate section of DDT’s due diligence questioning. Just as
this type of due diligence is necessary for the Acquirer because so many
organizations operate in silos, DDT inquiries must keep firmly in mind the
desired outcome: successful integration of the Target into the Acquirer,
the realistic means by which this may occur, and the realistic costs
associated with those efforts. That consolidation of services provides a
team focus “on risk management for process issues and on data conversion
for technology issues.”238
[105] This implicates a combination approach focused on systems
integration, rather than a transformation approach with an emphasis on
innovation.239 This combination approach may also incorporate some
235
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parts of a traditional preservation approach, where “stakeholder
management is the focal point of process issues, while communication
between business units is key for technology concerns.”240 With that in
mind, even though the DDT focus is on a point-by-point analysis and
presentation on discrete identifiable issues (and, where appropriate,
specific dollar amounts associated with addressing those issues), the DDT
will also consider issues as part of a strategic package that will give a
better overall chance for post-Deal success.
[106] In sum, the diligence may provide the memorialization of the
interviews with key Target SMEs; construct a data map or maps of
existing data information held according to existing IG practices as well as
exceptions relating to Legal Holds; and note how the identified
information is impacted by DP and IS considerations and restrictions.
When performed with the assistance of an appropriate service provider, as
detailed further in the next section, the DDT may also assign dollar
amounts to discrete actions the Acquirer will undertake as part of the
Deal’s harmonization or remediation efforts.
VI. Due Diligence Pricing Framework
A. Professional Services
[107] The pricing framework we suggest for the practitioner and service
provider model is divided into two components. First, the DDT will
consider the strategic risk assessment component, which is comprised of
the policies and procedures governing the movement of the data from the
Target to the Acquirer. Second, the DDT and service provider will catalog
the Target’s data volume, and utilize calculations to create or bid on
subsequent Acquirer integration or disposal efforts.
[108] To address DP concerns within the first step, the DDT would
determine whether the Acquirer desires to transmit any existing PII from
the Target. If that is the case, the DDT might outline a framework for
240
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Acquirer policy considerations; determine safe harbor implications; look
at the specific mechanisms by which that data would be modified, stored,
and utilized; and consider whether notifications to the individuals from
whom the PII was collected would be required.
[109] For IS concerns, the DDT will, among other things, evaluate the
costs of evaluating existing IS practices and determine any necessary
changed (e.g., if any permissions or password protections need to be
modified). On the e-Discovery side, the DDT will determine the current
and potential legal hold structure, existing legal hold data, and also outline
a process by which chain-of-custody information would travel with any
data transfers. In many instances, the DDT would arrange for a
subsequent attorney review to determine which legal holds had expired,
and work toward remediating related data stores. Finally, the DDT would
evaluate the existing IG structures (e.g., policies and record retention
schedules) and determine what an effective harmonization plan would
require.
B. Traditional IT Practices
[110] To implement many of the strategic points above and assist with
the second step of the pricing framework, service provider professionals
will assist DDT practitioners in the broad areas of collection, processing,
de-duplicating, formatting, categorizing, and integrating data into the
Acquirer’s data environment. At its most basic of level, the DDT will
identify discrete data stores and determine a strategic approach to dealing
with those stores; the service provider will review the strategy, quantify
the data amounts, and price out the discrete services listed above.
C. Emerging Technologies
[111] In addition to collecting the data in the Acquirer’s preferred
method or merely categorizing it in-place, service providers may utilize
the same type of data management tools utilized in traditional IG
practices, which include:
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“De-duplication tools to eliminate duplicate documents;
Dynamic archiving tools to move older data to cheaper storage
[or eliminating it entirely];
Organizational tools to classify and search;
Retirement tools to capture application data at sun-setting.”241

Newer strategies also incorporate file analysis (“FA”) tools which
“analyze, index, search, track and report on file metadata and, in some
cases, file content.”242 These types of tools give additional data on
electronic information, “not only by reporting on simple file attributes, but
also by providing detailed metadata and contextual information to enable
better information governance and storage management actions.”243
[112] Service providers may also be key for strategic IG harmonization
efforts relating to structured or database data, where a portion of the
integration efforts focuses on moving “legacy enterprise information
archiving systems to [the Acquirer or a] next generation, on-premises, or
SaaS [(Software as a Service)] products or services.”244 The service
provider may even work with the Acquirer to determine whether many of
the Target’s information assets would be better served by off-site storage
or in an archiving tool, “for storage management, e-Discovery,
compliance, indexing, search and business or market analysis.”245
[113] Some service providers have sought to differentiate their services
from traditional means of data analysis, and have touted a number of
241

PALOMINO & VANCIL, supra note 60, at 9.

242

CALDWELL, supra note 61, at 11.

243

Id. at 6.

244

LOGAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 3.

245

Id. at 3.

64

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

technologies that may be incorporated into this space. These include some
“machine learning”246 or “predictive coding”247 analytical processes that
are coming of age within the M&A due diligence process; for example,
the use of “concept search tools—already somewhat widely deployed in
the litigation context—to speed and focus the diligence process, appears to
be an impending development.”248
[114] There are some cautions surrounding the use of these tools, as most
experience with these tools has come through their use in e-Discovery,
where “a machine filters documents into one of two categories: responsive
or not. But in the world of IG, there are many, many more categories to
which records are assigned.”249 That is, when:
Searching legal documents, one is typically looking for
short passages of important operative language that will
affect: the disclosure against a representation in a deal
document; the need for third-party consents; termination
requirements; or other matters affecting the value of the
target or of the relevant assets. Although the passage may
have huge practical impact for the transaction, most times it
will: (1) only occur once; and (2) use of language very
similar to the content of many other legal documents of the
same nature.250
[115] This is the brave new frontier for IG, but current thinking holds
that the “[t]ask of sifting through this data is especially suited for the use
of predictive coding because these pools of information are so incredibly
246

CALDWELL, supra note 61, at 30.

247

Id. at 34.

248

BROWNSTONE & GREGORIAN, supra note 90.

249

Brostoff, supra note 209, at 642.

250

BROWNSTONE & GREGORIAN, supra note 90.
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large.”251 The premise is that predictive coding and similar technologies
allow IG practitioners to train the system to parse all of this data and
categorize it—remediating the unneeded information, and migrating the
remainder to the Acquirer.252 In fact, once a service provider has worked
with the Acquirer’s existing IG policies and schedules, the service
provider may find potential efficiencies within the Acquirer’s current (i.e.,
pre-Target data) environment; even when organizations “have developed
good information governance policies, ever increasing data sets may make
it difficult for the company to apply data policies,” and where a service
provider has done the legwork to codify the Acquirer’s policies and
integrated them with a tool with an information governance function,
“predictive coding can be used as a strategic information governance tool”
and where predictive coding can apply a policy to an organization’s data
sets in a large scale fashion, against e-mail, “archived data, active files,
and even unstructured data.”253
D. Informed, Incentivized Participants May Lead to More
Accurate Pricing
[116] After involvement with the DDT and the review of the collected
policies, related information, and the DDT data maps, an informed service
provider is positioned best to give hard numbers to those discrete,
quantifiable tasks the DDT process will raise. As envisioned and
implemented, the DDT would integrate a service provider team into the
interview and assessment process; the service provider would, in effect,
bid on the post-Deal tasks, and these bids would be presented as a portion
of the potential post-Deal cost to the Acquirer. This creates incentives
251

Brostoff, supra note 209, at 642.

252

See Brostoff, supra note 209, at 642.

253

Rebecca N. Shwayri, Use Predictive Coding As an Information Governance Tool,
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http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202634962120?slreturn=20140111100025,
archived at http://perma.cc/MJ24-NLQB.
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regarding two points for the service provider, which introduce efficiencies
to the deal.
[117] Under these circumstances, the DDT and service provider team are
committed to bringing back dollar figures to the Deal negotiation, such
that the Target and Acquirer can use those figures, among others, to
negotiate the proper price and structure of the Deal. That, in effect,
finalizes the work performed by the team; however, both the DDT and
service provider likely want the relationship with the Acquirer to continue,
and will bid the services for the post-Deal work appropriately, such that
they are not underbid for the post-Deal work once the Deal is completed.
[118] This format provides the first incentive, even more powerful since
the service provider is in the best position to determine exactly what those
costs might be, and will bid accordingly in an effort to secure the work.
Second, as indicated briefly above, once the service provider has done
work with the Acquirer and learned the Acquirer’s policies, schedules, and
systems, service providers understand that existing client relationships are
traditionally easier paths to additional opportunities.254
E. Fact Patterns and Service Provider Participation
[119] To demonstrate how service providers might evaluate quantifiable
post-Deal integration and remediation tasks, we compiled three distinct
fact patterns of varying levels of complexity that would correspond
generally to the type of data map or maps returned by the operation of the
DDT. Each included different types of information, storage media
(including paper documents), volumes, and character (e.g., identical data
types retained for very different purposes).
254

See, e.g., Michelle Class, Why You Should Cultivate Your Existing Clients,
MARKETING WITH CLASS (March 7, 2013),
http://www.marketingwithclass.com/2013/03/why-you-should-cultivate-your-existingclients, archived at http://perma.cc/UG5H-Q5PQ (“A 10% increase in customer retention
is equal to a 30% increase in company value . . . [and y]ou are 4 times more likely to do
business with an existing customer versus a new customer.”).
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Figure A

Figure B

Figure C

Cloud E-mail and Files
30 custodians
5 GB/custodian

E-mail Servers
100 custodians
3 GB/custodian

E-mail Servers
100 custodians
3 GB/custodian

File Servers
25 Discrete
4 GB/Server

File Servers
25 Discrete
4 GB/Server

Personal Computers
85 Discrete
25 GB/Computer

Personal Computers
85 Discrete
25 GB/Computer
Loose Devices
100 Discrete
1 GB/Device

Legal Hold Data
2 Matters
5 GB/Matter

Legal Hold Data
20 Matters
20 GB/Matter

Legal Hold Data
20 Matters
20 GB/Matter
BYOD Device Data
50 Discrete
2 GB/Device
ERP Systems
7 Discrete
25 GB/System

Paper Boxes
100 Discrete
2,250 pages/Box

Paper Boxes
2500 Discrete
2,250 pages/Box

Paper Boxes
2500 Discrete
2,250 pages/Box
File Cabinets
75 Discrete
8,000 pages/Cabinet

F. Exemplar Calculations—Public Information
[120] There was quite a bit of latitude among online sources of vendor
information, with costs ranging up to $30,000 per gigabyte of calibrated
data,255 which included “culling, organizing, and reviewing” the data.256
To derive a more simplistic formula to illustrate the framework, we began
255

See David Degnan, Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discovery, 12 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 151, 151 (2011).
256

Id. at 160. These actual costs are for the most part distinguishable from “recoverable”
costs associated with parties seeking bills of costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1), which are only “a fraction of the nontaxable expenses borne by
litigations.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S.Ct. 1997, 2006 (2012); see also
Life Plans, Inc. v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co., No. 11 C 8449, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
86195, at *18 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2014).
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with the basics. For old-fashioned paper stored in banker’s boxes,
research indicated that there were between 2,000 and 2,500 pages per
box.257 We used the mean for our calculation of 2,250 pages per banker’s
box figure to estimate the costs of scanning the information into ESI form.
Here, we used the industry standard $.05 per page258 for scanning and
Optical Character Recognition (“OCR”):
One banker’s box x 2,250 x $.05 = $112.5 per banker’s box scanning
and OCR cost
Next, we determined how many GB of ESI each banker’s box represented
after the scanning and OCR steps, reverse engineering research indicating
that Microsoft® Word® files averaged 64,783 pages per GB.259 With
2,250 pages per banker’s box, this provided the following GB equation:
2,250/64,783 = .03473 GB per banker’s box
Costs associated with the next step of the process—processing—are
falling, from $350 to $1,200260 per GB in late 2012 to recent estimates
ranging from $150 to $300.261 We assumed a $250 per GB price for
257

See Paper Calculator, NY DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT LLC, http://www.paperscanning-services.com/how-much-paper-do-i-have.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/U5VV-BG85.
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See Document Scanning Provides a Fast ROI, INDIGITAL, INC.,
http://www.indigitalinc.com/about-us/roi-model/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/JG9C-Y9KY.
259

See Discovery Services Fact Sheet: How Many Pages in a Gigabyte?, LEXISNEXIS,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitepapers/adi_fs_pagesinagiga
byte.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SD7G-W6KR.
260

See George Carry, Technology: Preparing and Managing a Budget for e-Discovery,
INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/08/03/technologypreparing-and-managing-a-budget-for-e-d, archived at http://perma.cc/Z32N-WZYB.
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69

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XXI, Issue 2

processing, and used that price across most sources of ESI for our
estimated costs. For example, one banker’s box of paper data scanned,
OCR’ed, and processed would cost the following:
(2,250p x $.05) + (0.03473 x $250.00)
or
($112.50) + ($8.68) = $121.18
With native, collected ESI (in contrast to the ESI created from paper),
Acquirers may gain efficiencies associated with processing less ESI per
GB collected by deNISTing and deduplicating collected files via indexes
and other pre-processing steps.262 But for purposes of our rough-hewn
calculations, we will assume that these steps occur across data postprocessing.
[121] We next assumed that our deNISTing and deduplicating processes
would eliminate 80% of the ESI kept generally within an organization, and
perhaps 65% of the higher-quality ESI dataset represented by the
information kept due to existing legal holds. We assumed that the paper
documents converted to ESI would not have the same range of
elimination, based both on the limitations associated with the OCR
process, as well as the thought that organizations would be less likely to
keep duplicate paper files than electronic ones.
[122] Then to evaluate the data kept, we imagined the use of a service
provider analysis step applied to each data set to extract information of
see also Kiwi Camara, Future of Legal Big Data, CS DISCO (Feb. 18, 2014),
http://www.csdisco.com/2014/02/18/future-of-legal-big-data/, archived at
http://perma.cc/4ABB-C4LF.
262

DeNISTing is a process using a sub-project of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (“NIST”) to remove computer application files, as opposed to user-created
information. Deduplicating removes file duplicates. See Jason Krause, Why DeNIST is
the Thing in e-Discovery, NEXTPOINT (June 11, 2014),
http://www.nextpoint.com/blog/denist-ediscovery/, archived at http://perma.cc/JSA2RMPB.
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value about the information, to determine what data should be kept—and
how. Our hypotheticals frame the analytical step as an application of
predictive coding or technology assisted review; however, other options,
including even simple or complex Boolean searches, may accomplish
similar aims.263 Estimated per-GB costs for analytical tools ranged from
$250–$700 in 2013;264 we assumed $400 as a middle ground, appreciating
that costs should continue to fall as technologies become more
commoditized.
[123] Running this analytical process against the data would provide the
means by which the Acquirer could then properly categorize and store (or
defensibly dispose of) information acquired from the Target.
[124] For the different media, our equations are:
1 Banker’s Box (1BB)
(2,250p x $.05) + (.03473GB x $250.00pro) + (.03473GB x $400.00anl)
or
($112.50) + ($8.68) + ($13.89) = $135.07
1 GB of Information Governance or non-Legal Hold unstructured
data (1GB IG GB)
(1GB IG x $250.00pro) + (1GB IG x .2 x $400.00anl)
or
($250.00) + ($80.00) = $330.00
1 GB of Legal Hold unstructured data (1GB LH)
(1GB LH x $250.00pro) + (1GB LH x .35 x $400.00anl)
or
263

See Jonathan Lewis et al., Time To Ditch Traditional Methods In Merger Probes,
LAW360 (June 6, 2014, 10:42 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/545359/, archived
at http://perma.cc/5FXU-HEWA.
264

See Bill George, Predictive Coding Primer Part One: Estimating Cost Savings,
TANENHOLTZ & ASSOCIATES, PLLC (Apr. 18, 2013), http://tanenholzlaw.com/predictivecoding-cost-savings, archived at http://perma.cc/B25Y-GLB6.
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($250.00) + ($140.00) = $390.00
Applied to the fact patterns presented, we determined the following:
Figure D
Grand Total
$515,407

Cloud E-mail and Files
30 custodians
5 GB/custodian

RIM Evaluation
600 GB (.6 TB)

Processing 600 GB to
Database @ $250/GB
=$150,000

Analytical Tools
.2 x 600 GB @ $400/
GB =$48,000

Subtotal
$198,000

Legal Hold Data
2 Matters
5 GB/Matter

Legal Hold Data
10 GB

Processing 10 GB to
Database @ $250/GB
=$2,500

Analytical Tools
.35 x 10 GB @ $400/
GB =$1,400

Subtotal
$3,900

Paper Boxes
100 Discrete
2,250 pages/Box

Paper Boxes
6,225,000 pages/
3.473 GB

Processing 3.473 GB
to Database @ $250/
GB =$868

Analytical Tools
3.473 GB @ $400/GB
= 1,389

Subtotal
$313,507

Scanning and OCR @
$.05/page =
$311,250
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Figure E
Grand Total
$1,326,940

E-mail Servers
100 custodians
3 GB/custodian

300 GB

File Servers
25 Discrete
4 GB/Server

100 GB

Personal Computers
85 Discrete
25 GB/Computer

2125 GB

RIM Evaluation
2,525 GB (2.525 TB)

Processing 2.525TB
to Database @ $250/
GB =$631,250

Analytical Tools .2 x
2.525 TB @ $400/GB
=$202,000

Subtotal
$833,250

Legal Hold Data
20 Matters
20 GB/Matter

Legal Hold Data
400 GB

Processing 400 GB to
Database @ $250/GB
=$25,000

Analytical Tools .35 x
400 GB @ $400/GB
=$56,000

Subtotal
$156,000

Paper Boxes
2,500 Discrete
2,250 pages/Box

Paper Boxes
5,625,000 pages/
86.83 GB

Processing 86.83 GB
to Database @ $250/
GB =$21,708

Analytical Tools
86.83 GB @ $400/GB
=$34,732

Subtotal
$337,690

Scanning and OCR @
$.05/page =
$281,250
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Figure F

E-mail Servers
100 custodians
3 GB/custodian

300 GB

File Servers
25 Discrete
4 GB/Server

100 GB

Personal Computers
85 Discrete
25 GB/Computer

2125 GB

Loose Devices
100 Discrete
1 GB/Device

100 GB

Grand Total
$1,422,959

RIM Evaluation
2,625 GB (2.625 TB)

Processing 2.625 TB
Database @ $250/GB
=$656,250

Analytical Tools .2 x
262.5 TB @ $400/GB
=$210,000

Subtotal
$866,250

Legal Hold Data
20 Matters
20 GB/Matter

Legal Hold Data
400 GB

Processing 400 GB to
Database @ $250/GB
=$100,000

Analytical Tools .35 x
400 GB @ $400/GB
=$56,000

Subtotal
$156,000

BYOD Device Data
50 Discrete
2 GB/Device

BYOD Device Data
100 GB

Processing 5% to
Database @ $250/GB
=$25,000

Analytical Tools
5 GB @ $400/GB
=$2,000

Subtotal
$27,000

Processing 96.09 GB
to Database @ $250/
GB =$24,023

Analytical Tools
96.09 GB @ $400/GB
=$38,436

Subtotal
$373,709

ERP Systems
7 Discrete
25 GB/Syste m

Paper Boxes
2,500 Discrete
2,250 pages/Box

File Cabinets
75 Discrete
8,000 pages/Cabinet

Paper Boxes
6,225,000 pages/
96.09 GB

Scanning and OCR @
$.05/page =
$311,250

Further, we would then incorporate project management fees varying from
$50–$275 per hour based on service provider time;265 attorney time would
also factor into this analysis.

265

See Seth Eichenholtz, Pricing Processing in e-Discovery: Keep the Invoice from Being
a Surprise, IN-HOUSE LITIGATOR 25:1 (2010), reprinted in Pretrial Practice and
Discovery 4, ABA (2011).
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[125] Finally, as imagined by this paper’s framework, practitioners
would address IS and DP concerns according to the specific needs of the
Deal, exemplified simply as:

-

-

-

G. Service Provider Figure Proposed Research
[126] If we investigate further, we propose soliciting the participation of
service providers within the IG and e-Discovery space, providing them
with this scholarship as well as the original fact patterns, asking them to
consider each fact pattern. We would allow the service providers to
determine what portion(s) of each fact pattern they would address, the
technology they would use, and even how they would characterize the
results of their efforts, along with the pricing they would provide.
Information shared during this process would be kept confidential vis-à75
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vis each service provider, unless (a) the service provider gave permission
to share their methodology and/or pricing; and (b) at least ten service
providers wished to share their particulars publicly.

VII. CONCLUSION
[127] We submit that a framework which considers DP, IS, e-Discovery,
and IG issues and their associated costs to the Acquirer during a Deal may
provide greater insight into the true overall “cost” of the Deal under the
appropriate circumstances. Due to the overlapping interests between each
of the specialties, a framework that takes all four into account (as well as
information about the Deal itself) may create efficiencies when
determining a strategy for post-Deal information transfer, evaluation,
integration, and disposal—working to avoid duplicative efforts while
focusing on the most important data sets identified through the due
diligence process. The associated costs may be further refined through the
incentivized structure provided by including the service providers as due
diligence team participants, who effectively bid for project work from a
position of near-insider information while still operating from a need to
secure project work post-Deal.
[128] Finally, in addition to presenting a more accurate Deal cost, the
operation of the framework may better define for the Acquirer the risks
associated with the Deal: both before the Deal is consummated, by
evaluating the point along the maturity model at which the Target exists;
and after the Deal, by considering and providing a process for dealing with
data privacy, data security, information governance, and e-Discovery
requirements and concerns. We do not submit that this type of analysis is
effective or even appropriate for every type of deal, but hope that it
continues to gain popularity within the M&A space as an addition to every
slate of considered due diligence practices.
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